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pirically, whether benefit-cost ratios for public elemen-
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THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Introduction 
Public economists Richard and Peggy Musgrave (30) de-
scrible the fiscal functions of government as falling \vithin 
the confines of three broad areas: allocation, distribution 
and stabilization. The first of these areas encompasses 
those governmental procedures which determine the level of 
resources devoted to providing social goods such as national 
defense or public highways. 
Through acts of budgetary planning, the government also 
takes steps to alter society's income distribution patterns 
to arrive at what decisionmakers deem a "fair" state of dis-
tribution. 
The stabilizing function of government encompasses those 
actions undertaken to maintain economic stability, \vhether it 
be through encouraging high levels of employment, minimizing 
increases in prices or stimulating productive growth. 
Of the three aforementioned functions, the first, that 
of allocation, is the concern of this paper. While the field 
of taxation is often mentioned in league with the two other 
fiscal functions (i.e., using tax policy as a redistributive 
1 
tool of income or as a stabilizing factor in economic man-
agement), it must be pointed out that taxation, in its very 
simplest construct, serves as a revenue source for the gov-
ernmental provision of social goods. 
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The taxpayer, under the allocative framework, plays the 
dual roles of both producer and consumer: serving not only 
as the supplier of the tax revenues that purchase social 
goods but also as the consumer of the social goods so pro-
vided. 
The nature of social goods is such that, as will be ex-
plained shortly, the private marketplace cannot provide 
them; rather, such goods must be funded through a political 
voting framework. This paper attempts to determine v7hether 
differences in the political voting structures under which 
the individual/producer provides tax revenues result in dif-
ferences in the costs of the social goods to the individual/ 
consumer. 
The intent of this paper is to examine the efficient 
use of scarce resources by the public sector; to determine 
what impact political structure has upon this efficient use 
of resources. More specifically, the task is to isolate a 
voting system that is efficient in terms of setting tax ex-
penditure levels for social goods. 
Social Goods 
Social goods are those that offer the consumer nonrival 
consumption benefits: an individual's partaking of a social 
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good does not reduce, or rival, the amount of the good 
available to others. Frequently, social or public goods al-
so share the characterization of being nonexcludable; that 
is, the costs of restricting access to social goods may be 
larger than the costs of maintaining such goods on an avail-
lable to all basis. 
As an example of a social good, let us look at the na-
tional park system in the U.S. One person's hiking through 
a forest does not reduce (barring vandalism) the amount of 
national forest left for a subsequent hiker to enjoy. Sim-
ilarly, the costs associated with restricting entry to the 
forest (hiring additional rangers for enforcement of re-
strictions or constructing physical barriers to limit entry) 
may prove greater than operating the forest as an open pre-
serve. 
The basic economic market structure with its accompany-
ing supply and demand tenets is well suited to the provision 
1 of private goods. The structure is founded on exchange, a 
process which can occur only where exclusive title to prop-
erty exists. However, the rights to social goods, such as 
the benefits received from highway construction or water 
treatment facilities, are not exclusive to any one individ-
ual. In the absence of vested property rights, the economic 
marketplace breaks down. 
1Those goods to which property rights, or exclusivity 
of ownership and rivalness of consuTiptive benefits may be 
assigned. 
Or, as the Musgraves (30) put it: 
Since the benefits [from social goods] are avail-
able to all, consumers will not voluntarily offer 
payment to the suppliers of social goods. The 
linkage between producer and consumer is broken 
and the government must step in to provide such 
goods (p. 8) . 
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In the provision of social goods, the political process 
acts as surrogate for the marketplace. Purchase of goods 
with greenbacks is replaced by purchase with votes and deci-
sionmaking through the ballot box substitutes for preference 
revelation through the market. With the knowledge that they 
must comply with the collective decisions reached through 
the ballot box, individuals will find it in their interest 
to vote for the option closest to their own choices, reveal-
ing, in this way, their personal preferences. 
Voting as Preference Revelation: 
The Political Science Approach 
Political scientists have spent much time documenting 
that preference for social goods is revealed through the act 
of voting. Typically, researchers such as Wilson and Ban-
field (53) have illustrated the types of public goods demand-
ed by specific groups of voters by focusing on voter actions 
in referenda elections. A profile of the individual voter 
emerges when socioeconomic characteristics of the voting 
population are linked to election outcomes. 
While the political scientists have focused on defining 
the mix of public goods preferred by voters of stipulated 
socioeconomic backgrounds, their studies have devoted little 
time to assessing the efficiency at which the public sector 
provides such goods or, for that matter, to assessing the 
effectiveness of the social goods so provided. 
Effectiveness and Efficiency 
of Social Goods Provision 
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Researchers, in assessing the effectiveness of the pub-
lic sector's provision of social goods, have focused on the 
procedures through which voter-determined expenditures are 
transformed into public goods of a specified quality. For 
example, the effectiveness of a state-run hospital might be 
assessed by comparing its success rate on certain operations 
(or conversely, its mortality rate) with that of private 
hospitals operating under similar budget constraints. 
Such attempts at determining the effectiveness of so-
cial goods do little, however, to quantify the efficiency of 
government's provision of such goods. To fill this void, 
economists have done much research into the efficient provi-
sion of social goods. 
In its simplest construct, efficiency in the funding of 
public goods characterizes the process through which monies 
are assigned to those public projects which will produce 
dollar benefits in excess of their dollar costs. Where more 
than one project competes for public funds, the efficient 
decisionmaker will commit funds to the project providing the 
highest rate of return, ceteris paribus. 
Thus, like those dealing with effectiveness in public 
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goods provision, studies on efficiency have focused on pub-
lic expenditures in what might be termed an ex-post ballot 
box approach. Both areas assume that the political voting 
structure from which funding decisions emerge is not a deter-
mining factor in the amount of funding available for public 
goods, or, in other words, the studies assume that the vot-
ing structure can be held constant for purposes of analyzing 
the application of voted funds to the procurement of public 
goods. 
The political scientists, in contrast, viewed the soci-
ological background of the individual voter as a determining 
factor in both the quantity and type of public goods made 
available through voting. In this ex-ante ballot box ap-
proach, the voting structure is agin regarded as invariant: 
acting only as a political medium through which individual 
desires in the guise of votes become transformed into con-
crete public projects. 
Nature of the Problem 
None of the three areas of study heretofore mentioned 
has dealt with the political voting structure itself as be-
ing a possible determinant of the l~vel of expenditures for 
public goods. Indeed, the only area of research to give 
mention to the political voting structure was that done by 
the political scientists, who typically selected referenda 
elections for their study. In their research, the referenda 
structure was of interest only because it simplified the 
correlation of socioeconomic characteristics of the voters 
with the object of expenditure. No attempt was made here 
(nor in the other two areas surveyed) to question whether a 
difference in the political voting structure itself through 
which decisions on the provision of public goods were made 
would affect the efficiency of providing such goods. 
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That a change in the political voting structure does 
affect the level of expenditures for public goods was demon-
strated quite recently by Proposition 13 in California. 
There, property tax rate-setting authority was assumed by 
the voters, through an initiative action. Where the deter-
mination of tax rates had previously been a function of the 
legislature, the initiative action of Proposition 13 made it 
a function of the citizenry directly. Proposition 13 has 
been seized on by many in the media as a very clear illus-
tration of the differences in expenditure levels (funded by 
property taxes) that can result when the political voting 
system concerned with tax rate-setting is altered from that 
of an indirect democracy to that of a direct democracy. 
In effect, the voters in California, under a political 
structure which allowed them to vote directly on the issues, 
established a level of property taxation different from that 
previously chosen by their state legislators. l.fuile much 
effort has been spent detailing the "goods" and "bads" of 
the hypothesized after-effects of Proposition's 13's passage 
(the spending of state surplus funds delaying any real meas-
urement of the after-effects until fiscal 1980-81) and in 
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listing the "causes" of the initiative action, little time 
has been spent on examining the initiative process as a ve-
hicle through which the individual voters may exercise the 
same tax-setting responsibilities (and hence, the same set-
ting of funding levels for public goods) as the legislators. 
The initiative itself is a political process by which 
the voters themselves determine the content of a ballot is-
sue and, through a petition process, place it on the ballot 
for voter approval or disapproval. The initiative is per-
mitted by the constitutions of twenty-one states (12, p. 
243) . 
The referendum refers to a political process in which a 
legislative body determines the contents of a ballot issue 
and places the issue on the ballot for voter approval or 
disapproval. The constitutions of twenty-one states provide 
for compulsory referenda for such issues as debt issuance or 
state constitutional amendments (19, p. 125). Referenda is-
sues tend to appear with more frequency than those of the 
initiative, perhaps because the former do not require peti-
tion signatures of voters for placement of the issue on the 
ballot and, in addition, are legally mandated. 
Both the initiative and the referendum processes, how-
ever, share the distinction of being political structures 
which enable the individual voter to participate directly in 
the political process. The voter, in a sense, is given the 
opportunity for self-legislation; citizen sentiment which 
may be given only indirect reflection through the legisla-
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tive process has the theoretical possibility of being voiced 
directly through the initiative/referendum processes. 
Through direct voting on a taxing scheme, the individu-
al voter may indeed have a greater possibility of influenc-
ing the outcome of the electoral process than might be true 
had the issue been decided by legislators, The legislative 
process is, after all, an indirect means of expressing the 
public's desires: legislators are elected under the premise 
that they will represent the desires of their constituents; 
whether their subsequent actions in office truly represent 
those desires may often depend on whose opinion is solicited. 
The prospect of any choice being made available to the 
individual as to the level of expenditures for public goods 
may be contingent upon that person's ability to make her or 
himself heard (i.e., to express preferences) within the con-
fines of the political structure. 
As the political scientists have illustrated, voter 
preference for collective goods is revealed through election 
results. However, the political scientists focused only on 
referenda election results. It should be pointed out that 
in a differently constructed polity, that is, in one where 
the expenditure levels are determined by the legislature, 
the individual's choice of public goods becomes a two-step 
process: through voting,. the taxpayer chooses a represent-
ative (ideally, one whose preferences coincide with those of 
the voter) who in turn selects the level of government ex-
penditures on public goods. 
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The question then becomes: if the voters are allowed 
to select directly the level of taxation desired (and by so 
selecting, fix the level of expenditures for public services 
provided by those tax funds), will they select a level dif-
ferent from that which would be selected by their represent-
atives? And secondly, will the level of benefits received 
from those public goods provided under a direct voting po-
litical system differ from those received under an indirect 
system? 
The process of answering such questions is greatly 
aided by identifying an area of public goods provision where 
it is relatively easy to trace tax dollars to their object 
of expenditure. One situation where this occurs is in the 
area of education. The earmarking of tax revenues to supply 
the specific public good of education makes the task of as-
sessing political system efficiency much more feasible. 
Objective of This Study 
It is the objective of this study to determine the ef-
ficiency of providing a specific public good, that of public 
elementary and secondary education, through differently con-
structed political voting systems. An efficiency criterion 
will be determined independently of ex-ante calculations of 
lifetime earnings attributable to education, thus minimizing 
some of the weaknesses heretofore inherent in efficiency 
studies on public education. 
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Need for This Research 
Support of education consumes an enormous portion of 
the public sector budget. In 1977, public sector expendi-
tures for education totaled $110.6 billion and accounted for 
over 27% of total public expenditures other than defense (47, 
p. 27). 
Education, as Cohn (10, p. 3) points out, is "the larg-
est single industry in the U.S." In 1977, it employed 2.4 
million teachers, involved over 59 million pupils (51, p. 6) 
from kindergarten through college and spent nearly 8% of the 
nation's resources, or GNP (51, p. 27). 
Given the magnitude of both the monetary and physical 
investment in the field of education, any analysis directed 
towards improving the efficiency of providing this public 
good could result in a substantial savings of scarce re-
sources. 
This study will empirically determine whether differ-
ences in political voting structures result in differences 
in the efficient provision of public elementary and second-
ary education. The study may offer confirming or contra~ 
dieting support to the much touted ill effects of a direct 
democractic system (the system often mentioned in conjunction 
with taxpayers' revolts). 
In addition, this study may illustrate the need for ac-
countants to become more involved in the area of policy-
making within the field of taxation. Too often, accountants 
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have resigned themselves to the position of being policy-
takers in the area of taxation--implementing rules legislat-
ed by other professions and inquiring into the economic 
effects of such legislation only after its passage into law. 
Tax accountants might be better advised to spend less time 
arguing about the proper way to administer previously estab-
lished ends of an economic policy such as taxation and to 
spend more time in learning how to structure the economic 
and political means such that desired ends can be achieved. 
Study of the political systems under which taxing poli-
cies are presently being administered is but one variable in 
developing an accounting approach to the planning of tax 
policy; it is evident that much more work in tax policy 
needs to be done if accountants are to serve as more than 
Code-interpreters. 
Limitations of the Study 
In terms of limitations, it must be pointed out that 
this study is not designed to be applicable on a national 
scale. Since the research was undertaken on a county-wide 
basis within two mid-western states, extensions of the re-
search may be limited to those states which finance their 
public elementary and secondary schools at the local level 
through property taxes and to those states which can be i-
dentified as having different local political structures. 
Extension of the methods of this study also depends on 
the ability of the researcher to trace tax revenues to their 
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objects of expenditures. Such earmarking of tax revenues to 
expenditures as was evident in this study for the public 
good of education may not be present in situations where 
public goods are financed by general funds, for example. 
Lastly, this study concentrates on developing a state 
to state comparison of efficiency and, as such, ignores in-
tra-state differences that may exist in both the ability to 
fund pub lie education and the need to provide for it. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
Chapter II of this study details three approaches taken 
by other researchers in their study of the provision of pub-
lic goods and concludes with a statement of the approach to 
be followed in this study. 
The research hypotheses and the research methodology 
are contained in Chapter III; while Chapter IV details the 
empirical results of the research. 
As the final chapter, Chapter V contains a summary of 
the research effort, presents the conclusions reached by 
this author and offers suggestions for further research in 
the field. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Past research efforts focusing on the provision of pub-
lic goods have tended to take one of three approaches: (1) 
a behavioristic approach, in which election results (voter 
behavior) are explained by reference to certain socio-eco-
nomic characteristics of the voters; (2) an industrial ap-
proach, in which a production function delineates the rate 
at which inputs (expenditures) for public goods become 
transformed into outputs (public goods) and gauges the effec-
tiveness of such a process (a cost-quality comparison); (3) 
an economic approach, in which present dollar expenditures 
for public goods are compared with the projected dollar ben-
efits expected to be obtained from such goods. 
This chapter details some of the research efforts pre·-
viously conducted in each of the three aforementioned areas. 
The focus of this review is on those studies which, like 
this paper, concern themselves with the public good of edu-
cation. 
The Behavioristic Approach 
The problem of estimating individual demands for col-
14 
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lective goods may be approached by examining voter behavior 
on referenda for such goods. 
Voting outcomes on the referenda are presumed to re-
flect the desires of the median voter, a concept which was 
advanced in 1943 by Bowen (8) . Utilizing an analytical 
framework, Bowen (8) held as constant each community mem-
ber's share of the total cost of a public good, which guar-
anteed that an individual's preferred level of output for 
that good would occur at the point where that person's mar-
ginal valuation and tax cost for the good were equivalent. 
In Bowen's (8) treatise, the final outcome of succes-
sive ballot issues offering incremental increases in outlays 
for a public good v7as at the median of the individually pre-
ferred levels of output. Thus, the equilibrium level of pub-
lic spending would exactly satisfy the public service demand 
of the median voter. 
Black (7), in The Theory of Committees and Elections, 
stressed that a majority rule of voting would produce an e-
quilibrium outcome when voter preferences were single-peaked 
in nature. This equilibrium outcome, in turn, would exist 
at the median of the individually preferred outcomes. 
Despite the apparent severity of the assumptions Black 
(7) employed in his median voter public choice model (re-
quiring all political issues to be presented in a bivariate 
manner, so that individual preference curves would al\.;ays be 
single-peaked), the model did provide a vehicle for analyz-
ing collective consumption patterns in terms of personal de-
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mands. As a result, most demand oriented public expenditure 
studies have been built upon the median voter premise (14, p. 
210). 
Both Bowen (8) and Black (7) relied upon the familiar 
economic market behavior assumption that the individual will 
behave in a rational manner in the decision-making process, 
i.e., would act to maximize self-interest. This self-inter-
est assumption of the private sector was challenged by Wil-
son and Banfield (53, p. 869), \vho empirically found that 
voter behavior of certain classes of individuals tended to 
be more public-regarding and less private-regarding than 
that of others. 
In testing the hypothesis that self-interest (defined 
as the maximization of family income) could successfully ex-
plain voting behavior on municipal public finance referenda, 
Wilson and Banfield (53) obtained certain anomalous results 
(in particular, finding that high income voters favored the 
provision of welfare services). These observations led the 
pair to introduce the notion of "public regardiness" as an 
attribute of certain classes of voters which induced them to 
vote against their self-interest. 
Much of the evidence Wilson and Banfield (53) advanced 
in support of the public regardiness concept appears vague 
at best; it is difficult to specify what constitutes public-
regarding behavior in specific instances. Later work done 
by Frey and Kohn (18, p. 803) refuted the public regardiness 
concept: "The rich do not exhibit a significantly larger 
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percentage of yes votes than the middle or low income class''. 
Levy's (24, p. 433) 1975 article seconds Frey and Kohn (18) 
by noting that wealthy persons' conservative tendencies out-
weighed their willingness to help those in need. 
On balance, existing evidence in support of the self-
interest view in public choice has been sufficiently con-
vincing to most researchers to induce them to adopt it as 
axiomatic (14), (13), (37). 
Subsequent research on voting behavior has adhered to 
the methodology employed by Wilson and Banfield (53): uti-
lizing a mix of socioeconomic factors in a regression format 
to explain public choice behavior, with the latter expressed 
either in terms of election returns or as expenditure levels 
for public goods. 
Birdsall (6), for example, in a study on bond finance 
referenda, utilized the percentage of voters favoring a ref-
erendum as a measure of the intensity of preference for the 
public services involved. He then related these preferences 
to a set of socioeconomic characteristics of the general 
~opulation to obtain a voter profile. 
In his 1977 work, Barkume (3, p. 583) noted that his 
regression :r1odel for two high school district tax rate elec-
tions "explained a substantial proportion of the observed 
voting pattern." Barkume's (3) study was a cross-sectional 
analysis which used household characteristics relating to 
demand for public education as independent variables in ex-
plaining tax rate election results. 
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Neufield (34), Deacon and Shapiro (13), Levy (27) and 
Mariotti (28) have also viewed voting outcomes on referenda 
as reflections of the demand for public goods and have used 
ordinary least-squares to regress socioeconomic characteris-
tics of the population upon the election results. 
While voter behavior studies have for the most part 
concentrated on explaining election results or the expendi-
tures for public goods by referring to personal attributes 
of the voters, their reliance on certain data sources may 
have several shortcomings. 
The socioeconomic variables of the voter behaviorists 
are usually derived from societal measures (i.e., U.S. Cen-
sus data). The voting results from a particular election, 
however, may reflect the preferences of only a fraction of 
society. In other words, if the persons who actually cast 
ballots are not a representative sample of the population at 
large, the use of socioeconomic data on populations to ana-
lyze voting patterns may be inappropriate. 
In addition, reliance on Census data as a source for 
demographics may "freeze" the independent variables at one 
point in time; if voting results from a later time are used 
in ordinary least squares with the same demographics, the 
model will have failed to capture possible changes in commu-
nity characteristics during this time lapse. 
Although the voter behavior studies may serve as a 
measure of explanation for the quantity and type of public 
choice demand, they do not measure the quality of the 
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resultant collective goods provided. 
In an attempt to assess this quality, researchers have 
focused on the transformation process through which voter-
chosen levels of expenditures are translated into identifia-
ble public goods. Such input-output studies have, in terms 
of the public good of education, concerned themselves most 
with determining what specific educational resources would 
produce the greatest gain in students' scholastic achieve-
ment. 
The Industrial Approach 
An input-output relationship between educational ex-
penditures and educational quality may be expressed as 
an educational production function. Such a function quanti-
fies the maximum amount of educational output (measured in 
terms of increased learning, for example) that can be pro-
duced by dollar inputs of specific educational resources. 
In educational research, outputs resulting from dif-
fering levels of educational investment tend to be expressed 
in terms of pupil performance on standardized achievement 
tests. The assumption which is implicit in analyzing this 
relationship between expenditure and achievement is that pu-
pil performance on standardized achievement tests provides 
an index of educational output, or quality. 
One of the earliest attempts at assessing educational 
effectiveness was conducted by the New York State Department 
of Education from 1957-60. Data from this study were subse-
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quently analyzed by Kiesling (1) in 1967. 
Pupils participating in the New York program were first 
stratified by grade, socioeconomic class (as determined by 
their father's job) and size of school district, then given 
an achievement test designed for their grade level (1, p. 
251) . 
For each grade level and socioeconomic group, the aver-
age school district achievement was regressed on average pu-
pil intelligence, school district size and annual per pupil 
expenditure. The expenditure-performance relationship was 
strongest, Kiesling (1) found, for students in the lower 
grades, middle socioeconomic groups and large school dis-
tricts. 
In a 1963 study, Benson (1) analyzed the results of a 
reading comprehension test which had been administered to 
fifth-graders in 249 California school districts. 
In addition to test results, Benson (1) collected data 
from published sources on school inputs and socioeconomic 
characteristics of district residents. These explanatory 
variables were then used by Benson (1) in a series of step-
wise regressions on the median test score for various group-
ings of school districts. 
Benson (1, p. 251) found that one or more of the school 
input variables were significant in explaining test scores 
in each regression; however, since he did not report regres-
sion coefficients, it is not possible to compute the per-
centage improvement in pupil achievement associated with an 
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increased supply of a school variable. 
Possibly the most extensive input-output study on edu-
cation was that conducted by Coleman (1) under the direction 
of the U.S. Office of Education in 1966. The Equality of 
Educational Opportunity Study (which has come to be known as 
the Coleman Report) was based on a stratified national sam-
ple survey of over 600,000 students and their schools and 
homes. 
Like previous input-output studies, the Coleman Report 
regressed a series of explanatory variables upon student 
achievement test scores (in this case, a verbal achievement 
test administered by the Educational Testing Service was 
used). The independent variables were grouped into catego-
ries of student attitudes, student background, school char-
acteristics, student body characteristics and teacher traits 
(1, p. 253) .. 
Because the independent variable groups were highly 
correlated with one another, only a portion of the variance 
in reading achievement scores could be assigned uniquely to 
a specific group of characteristics. 
Using the Coleman Report's method of multiple step-wise 
regressions, the portion of the variance in test scores ex-
plained by an independent variables depended on the order in 
which that variable was entered into the regression equation. 
Because Coleman (1) uniformly entered student background 
variables into the regression equation first, he minimized 
the amount of test score variance attributable to the many 
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school variables. Thus, the conclusion of the Report was 
that, although schools do make a difference in terms of stu-
dent achievement, the primary factor in student success was 
that of the student's personal background. 
The use of achievement test scores as a surrogate for 
educational effectiveness has drawn a great deal of criti-
cism. The most serious concern with the tests is that they 
may not measure precisely what they purport to measure. A 
reading test, for example, may actually assess skills other 
than reading, such as reasoning or general intellectual a-
bility. Test questions that measure reasoning may be 
heavily influenced by non-school factors such as home back-
ground and innate ability (29, p. 425). Such questions 
should not be included in a reading test which purports to 
measure the quality of reading instruction of a school sys-
tem. 
Most standardized achievement tests were not designed 
for the purpose of evaluating a school program's effective-
ness; rather, they were geared towards measuring a student's 
general intellectual ability so that the school could make 
counseling and classification decisions. 
Since standardized tests are not very sensitive to in-
struction and were designed to measure general intellectual 
ability (which is affected by non-school factors such as 
family background), it is not surprising, as HcDermott 
and Klein (29, p. 426) point out, that family background (as 
in the Coleman Report) should correlate higher with achieve-
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scores than school expenditures. 
The expenditure indices used by researchers may also be 
inadequate, in that they fail to adequately match specific 
inputs with the specific outputs being measured. A reading 
test, for example, can at best only measure the results ob-
tained from a very small portion of the resources devoted to 
a school district's educational program. To correlate per-
formance on reading tests with expenditures that comprise 
all school inputs is to use the tests for purposes for which 
they \vere never designed (29, p. 427). 
In addition, any association, or correlation, betHeen 
educational expenditures and achievement scores established 
through regression analysis represents a statistical re-
lationship between the two variables and not necessarily a 
causal relationship. Thus, a statement that higher educa-
tional expenditures cause higher achievement scores is not 
implied and does not necessarily follow from a positive cor-
relation between the two items. 
Another defect in input-output studies is the cross-
sectional nature of the research, whereby the relationship 
between inputs and outputs is examined at a single point in 
time. Such research assumes that any differences in inputs 
received in prior years did not have any impact on the out-
put assessed in the study year (29, p. 430). To say that a 
child's reading comprehension in fifth grade is a function 
of educational expenditures of that year alone is to negate 
the influence of that student's preceding four years of edu-
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ation upon that student's reading ability. 
While input-output analysis has attempted to define a 
cost-quality, or cost-effectiveness structure for the public 
good of education, it has done little in the way of assess-
ing the efficiency aspect of educational expenditures. 
The Economic Approach 
Much of the work on educational efficiency has been 
done by economists under the structure of the traditional 
dollar benefit-cost approach. The commitment of funds to 
education is taken as a given, with the efficiency question 
being asked in terms of the return to the individual or so-
ciety as a whole that can be expected as a result of this 
funding. In other words, efficiency research does not con-
cern itself with finding alternative sources for the funds 
presently devoted to education. 
In the benefit-cost approach to public education, the 
educational benefits are measured by the additional lifetime 
income, properly discounted to present value, that is at-
tributable to the cost of the educational investment. 
The majority of studies on the relationship between ed-
ucation and income use as their principal source of data the 
U.S. Census of Population, which classifies income of per-
sons according to age and educational attainment. The Cen-
sus provides the researcher with the chance to estimate the 
contribution of education to income by correlating the 
cross-sectional data. 
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As Cohn (10, p. 136) points out: "The possibility of a 
purely spurious correlation between education and income 
cannot be summarily dismissed." But Cohn (10, p. 232) is 
quick to note that "we have by now many studies, using dif-
ferent data bases, that show very similar net education to 
income relationships." 
Weisbrod (52, p. 45) echoes Cohn (10): "There is 
scarcely any doubt that education does make a person more 
productive and does thereby increase his earning power." 
The question then becomes what percentage of the dif-
ferences in incomes associated with education is actually 
caused by education? Denison (15) uses a figure of 60%; 
Hines (23) cites studies indicating a range from 60 to 88%. 
Garms (20, p. 213), in his benefit-cost analysis of the Up-
ward Bound program, adopted the position that a high propor-
tion of the income differentials correlating with education 
levels could be caused by education, and used a figure of 
75%. 
In contrast, Lassiter (26, p. 19), using 1960 Census 
data, found regression coefficients for education that were 
significant but low, explaining between 39 and 52% of the 
variance in income in middle-age groups. Schweitzer (39, p. 
325) reiterates that "it is possible to conclude that there 
is a small but significant component of earnings which is 
explainable in terms of educational attainment." 
Thus, while the researchers differ on the percentage of 
income differentials that may be attributable to education, 
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they all define increased future income streams of individu-
als as the primary benefit of educational expenditures. 
This assumption that public education expenditures are 
made, at least implicity, with an eye to anticipated bene-
fits, is nothing more than the rationality assumption of 
consumer behavior applied to public services. 
The use of a rationalistic welfare-maximization model 
for public goods, however, does not imply that voters actu-
ally and carefully ";veigh costs and benefits explicitly in 
the process of reaching a decision on expenditure levels. 
Rather, the interpretation is that they behave collectively 
as if they were maximizing. 
The economic approach to public choice does not assume 
that citizens are always conscious of the benefits they re-
ceive from the education of others; rather, it recognizes 
that citizens may not calculate the benefits of education 
any more carefully or correctly than consumers calculate the 
benefits received from a purchase of an automobile or a pair 
of shoes (52, p. 123). 
Acting on the basis of the preceding economic assump-
tions and accepting the implied causality between education 
and future income, empirical research in the field has con-
centrated on quantifying the benefit-cost aspects of educa-
tion. 
Hanoch's 1967 study (22) on earnings and schooling 
correlated expected earnings of males in the U.S. with age· 
and education, then derived internal rates of return for 
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schooling in the U.S. 
Hanoch (22) held constant a number of factors in his 
calculations, chiefly those of geographical region, urban 
or rural residence, mobility, marital status and size of 
family. His estimate of the total education-earnings func-
tion gives, according to Schultz (38, p. 298), "the best 
estimate of returns from schooling in the U.S." 
Hanoch's (22) method of analysis parallels that of 
Hirsch and Segelhorst (24) who used multivariate analysis to 
study the effect of education on income, while holding the 
effects of other variables, such as race, sex and father's 
occupation constant. Hirsch and Segelhorst (24) found a 
significant (at the .05 level) relationship between educa-
tion and income. 
Holfe and Smith (54) also found differentials between 
the earnings of highly educated individuals (college gradu-
ates) and those of less educated persons (non-graduates), 
even though both groups were similar in terms of I.Q., 
grades achieved and family background. 
In terms of actual results, Hanoch (22) found average 
internal rates of return for white male high school gradu-
ates in 1960 to range from 16% (Northern region) to 19% 
(Southern region) with nonwhites having rates from 22% 
(North) to 12% (South). Hanoch (22, p. 324) notes that such 
rates, although "lower than is usually claimed" are still 
"considerably higher than rates of interest in the market 
and somewhat higher than average rates of return generally 
estimated for nonhuman capital." 
Becker (5, p. 128) estimated internal rates of return 
for white males completing high school in the U.S. of 16%, 
20%, 25%, 28% and 28% for the years 1939, 1949, 1956, 1958 
and 1959, respectively. 
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Garms (20) found white and nomvhite males to have life-
time incomes associated with four years of high school of 
$478,280 and $309,765, respectively, When discounted to 
present value using a 5% rate, these figures became $147,951 
and $99,817; with a rate of 10%, they were $66,940 and 
$46,323. 
Criticism of the benefit-cost studies in education has 
been directed at their use of ex-post information to test 
ex-ante hypotheses. Reliance on past censuses to give data 
for future benefit calculations rests on the assumption that 
the existing pattern of economic life will continue far into 
the future. 
Or, as Schultz (38) notes: 
Our estimates of the profiles of lifetime earnings 
from education are pictures of the past. They re-
veal ex-post supply and demand intercepts of the 
capabilities acquired from education. But when it 
comes to projecting these estimates into the future, 
reason, economic logic and theory and appeals to 
probabilities are quite imperfect in making projec-
tions that will prove to be right (p. 305). 
In other words, traditional benefit-cost analysis of 
education suffers in that it relies on a dollar esti~ate of 
lifetime income attributable to education. Construction of 
such an estimate requires the researcher to anticipate all 
possible events which may affect an individual's earnings 
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capacity over that person's lifetime. 
The researcher must not only forecast changes in earn-
ings which may occur from the action of inflation, but must 
(if a realistic figure is to be obtained) also anticipate 
the effect of events such as merit raises, promotions and 
possible job changes on lifetime earnings. 
The lifetime earnings calculation also forces the re-
searcher to stipulate personal factors for the worker: mo-
bility factors (which might result in a different wage or 
pay structure), supplemental earnings possibilities from 
overtime or moonlighting, probability of work lapses due to 
strikes, lay-offs or firings, as well as the anticipated 
mortality date. 
The resultant dollar figure for lifetime earnings which 
is attributable to education, although impressive in amount, 
may bear so little relationship to the real world that the 
figure's value for comparative purposes may be rather limit-
ed. 
The Research Approach of This Study 
This study attempts to deter~ine the efficiency of pro-
viding the specific public good of elementary and secondary 
education through differently constructed political voting 
systems. To minimize some of the weaknesses heretofore in-
herent in benefit-cost models, the study will construct an 
efficiency criterion independent of ex-ante calculations of 
lifetime earnings. 
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Public elementary and secondary education represents an 
area of social goods provision where it is relatively easy 
to trace tax dollars to their objects of expenditure. This 
is because the property tax on real property, for many lo-
calities in the U.S. today, serves as an earmarked revenue 
source for elementary and secondary education. 
Unlike income and excise taxes, then, the linkage be-
tween the imposition and expenditure side of the property 
tax structure is fairly easy to establish and an efficiency 
study of the voting structure surro~Dding such a tax becomes 
that much more feasible. 
In terms of being able to isolate two different politi-
cal structures under which this earmarked tax for education 
is imposed, the problem becomes more complicated. The tend-
ency is for most localities to fund elementary and secondary 
education through voter approval of property tax rates (a 
referendum process where school district administrators typ-
ically structure the ballot tax issue). It cannot be over-
looked, however, that localities do exist that fund such 
educational expenditures without submitting the tax rates to 
voter approval (a legislative process). Among the former 
groups (referendum-set tax rates), the state of Ohio is one 
of the most prolific in the nation in terms of submitting 
education tax levies to the voters for approval, having held 
114 school bond elections and 600 tax levy elections in the 
space of three years (1970-72) (21, p. 4). 
However, the state of Indiana, during the same peri-
. -
od, held no such elections, either for school bonds or for 
school operating tax levies, simply because its state con-
stitution does not require voter approval of funding proc-
esses of elementary and secondary education (49, pp. 129, 
130). 
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This study will calculate the effective property tax 
rate applicable to education in each county of the two a~ 
forementioned states during four time periods. Effective 
tax rates for education of the counties of the two states 
will be compared, using a one-way analysis of variance de-
sign, to determine whether significant differences exist be-
tween each polity's setting of tax rates for the financing 
of education. 
In addition, retention rates for elementary and second-
ary school systems will be determined on a county-wide basis 
for each of the intervals of the study; then compared using 
ANOVA for significant differences. 
Finally, benefit-cost ratios will be constructed for 
each county, using the tax rates and retention rates as sur-
rogates for costs and benefits of education, respectively. 
The ratios will be aggregated into state-wide benefit-cost 
ratios for each state for each period within the study to 
obtain a measure of efficiency. 
The following chapter introduces the research hypothe-
ses of this study and details the specific methodology used 
to test the statistical equivalents of these hypotheses. 
CHAPTER III 
HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
This research effort focuses on determining whether 
there exist efficiency differences in the provision of pub-
. lie goods between differently-constructed political voting 
systems. As noted in Chapter I, this study of the efficien-
cy, or costs and benefits of public goods, prompts the fol-
lowing research questions: 
1. Will the level of taxation selected for the fund-
ing of public goods by the populace under a direct 
voting system differ from that level which would be 
set by legislators under an indirect voting system? 
2. Will the level of benefits received from tax-fund-
ed public goods provided through a direct voting 
system differ from that level provided through an 
indirect system? 
As the preceding chapters point out, the study of effi-
ciency in public goods provision is simplified by focusing 
on those goods funded through earmarked taxes. Such is the 
case with public elementary and secondary education; where, 
at the local level, the property tax serves as the primary 
source of funding (43, p. 2). 
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The selection of the two states of Indiana and Ohio as 
focal areas for this study of the provision of public ele~ 
mentary and secondary education proceeds directly from the 
study's focus on differently-constr~cted voting systems. 
Under state law, Ohio school districts must submit tax lev-
ies to voter approval; in contrast, Indiana districts may 
levy taxes and issue bonds without voter approval (49, p. 
130 and 280). Thus, in the provision of public elementary 
and secondary education, Ohio serves as an example of a di-
rect voting system; Indiana, as an example of an indirect 
voting system. 
In order for this research to focus solely on the dif-
ferences in voting systems between the states of Indiana and 
Ohio, it was necessary to determine 'vhether there were other 
demographic differences between the polities that might pos-
sibly be the cause of different levels of efficiency in the 
provision of education. Appendix B of this paper details 
the statistical steps undertaken to demonstrate that Indiana 
and Ohio possess the same financial ability to purchase pub-
lic education in addition to evidencing the same need for 
purchasing such a good. 
With the states of Indiana and Ohio serving respective-
ly to illustrate the indirect and direct voting systems 
mentioned in the researchquestions, the identification of 
specific real-world surrogates for the costs and benefits of 
the public good under consideration (elementary and second-
ary education) became the next step in translating the re-
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search questions' implied hypotheses into statistically 
testable equivalents. 
The Hypotheses 
In specific form, the research questions of this study 
will be tested in the form of the following two null hypoth-
eses: 
1. The effective local property tax rate for public 
elementary and secondary education does not differ 
between the differently-constructed polities of 
Indiana and Ohio; that is, between a state where 
tax rates for education are legislatively-deter-
mined (Indiana) and one where they are voter-deter-
mined through referenda (Ohio). 
Or, H0 : No difference in effective tax rates for 
public elementary and secondary education between 
Indiana and Ohio. 
2. The retention rate of public elementary and second-
ary education does not differ between the differ-
ently-constructed polities of Indiana and Ohio. 
Or, H : No difference in retention rates for pub-o 
lie elementary and·secondary education between 
Indiana and Ohio. 
In the above hypotheses, the effective local property 
tax rate serves as the surrogate for the cost of public ele-
mentary and secondary education; the retention rate of pub-
lie elementary and secondary schools is the surrogate for 
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the benefits received from education. Discussion of the 
construction of such rates is deferred momentarily in order 
to focus on the time period and data elements encompassed 
by the study. 
Time Period Encompassed by the Study 
This study concerns itself with the costs and benefits 
(as defined in succeeding sections of this chapter) of pub-
lic elementary and secondary education in the states of 
Indiana and Ohio during each of the four following years: 
1964, 1967, 1971 and 1976. The restriction of the study to 
these four years arose because assessment-sales price ratios 
for Indiana (required in calculating the effective tax rate 
for education) were not available for any other years. 
For 1964 and 1967, the assessment-sales price ratios 
for Indiana used in this study are those compiled by the 
Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners. State-wide ratio 
studies in Indiana were discontinued, however, in 1967 (48, 
p. 6). The assessment-sales price ratios for 1971 and 1976 
for Indiana were obtained from the 1972 and 1977 Census of 
Governments (44). 
In order to align the data collection process in the 
state of Ohio with that in Indiana, state-produced assess-
ment-sales price ratios were used in Ohio, as in Indiana, 
for 1964 and 1967, with Census of Governments (44) ratios 
being employed for 1971 and 1976. Even though the state of 
Ohio did generate assessment-sales price ratios on its own 
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for 1971 and 1976, it was felt that a more controlled ap-
proach to the empirical testing would result if both states 
under study had assessment-sales price ratios generated from 
similar cources (either both state-generated or both feder-
ally-generated ratios). 
The Data Collection Process 
Data for the study were collected on a county-wide ba-
sis in both states for each of the four years in the study. 
In 1964 and 1967, data were collected for every county in 
each of the two states (Indiana had 92 counties; Ohio has 
88). In 1971 and 1976, when it was necessary to rely on 
federally-collected assessment-sales price ratios for Indi-
ana, it was also necessary to reduce the number of counties 
studied. This reduction occurred simply because the feder-
ally-produced data derived from a sample of all counties in 
Indiana and Ohio; thus, county selection in this study is 
pegged to the federal sample of counties in the 1972 and 
1977 Census of Governments, Volume 2: Taxable Property 
Values and Assessment-Sales Price Ratios, "Statistics on 
Real Property Assessments and Heasurable Sales Occurring 
During a Six Month Period for Selected Local Areas" (44, 
Tables 11 and 19 in 1972 and 1977, respectively) for which 
the necessary assessment-sales price ratios were furnished. 
The number of counties studied in 1971 totaled 33 for Indi-
ana and 48 for Ohio; in 1976, the total was 36 in Indiana 
and 42 in Ohio. It should be emphasized, however, that re-
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liance on a random sample of com1ties (as in the 1972 and 
1976 Census of Governments selection) in order to provide a 
portrayal of the states is very much within the boundaries 
of acceptable empirical research. 
The Focus of This Study 
TI1is study equates benefits received from public ele-
mentary and secondary education with the retention ability 
of the school system; costs are equated with the real prop-
erty taxes levied for such education. 
Thus, in terms of this study, the benefit-cost ratio 





B = benefits of public elementary and second-
ary education 
C costs of public elementary and secondary 
education 
{f • 1\ · I = pupils (#) retained in school (Rb) and 
the earnings (I) attributable to their 
education 
= effective tax rate (R ) levied on real c property (T) for school operations 
If one were interested in determining a dollar benefit-
cost ratio, it would be necessary both to determine a reten-
tion rate for each grade level and to assign a future 
incremental income stream to those students completing each 
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grade level. As Chapter II pointed out, the calculation of 
a worker's lifetime earnings involves a foray into the fu-
ture , armed only with data from the past: one posits a re-
lationship between education and earnings based on current 
data; then extends it forward, attempting to adjust for in-
flation, mortality and, possibly, productivity (merit 
raises) along the way. TI1e resulting dollar total is then 
discounted back to the present, utilizing an interest rate 
preselected by the researcher. The end result, while gener-
ally impressive in magnitude, as most large-dollar amounts 
are, remains somewhat divorced from reality. It is, after 
all, a valid estimate of the future only if the future con-
tinues to behave as did the past. 
One can bypass the imputing of hypothetical dollar a-
mounts and yet still derive an indication as to \!J'hether 
benefits will exceed costs, by focusing on the other compo-
nents of the benefit-cost equation. By transposing the 
benefit-cost equation, we may view it, not as a ratio of 
total dollar benefits to total dollar costs, but as a ratio 
of the benefit rate to the cost rate, as the following equa-
tions demonstrate. 
Original Equation: B 
c-




B -c- T 1fo • I 
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If the retention rate exceeds that of the cost rate, 
the construction of the transposed equation is such that 
dollar benefits will also exceed dollar costs. A benefit-
cost ratio based on rates may then be used as a gauge of the 
direction the dollar benefit-cost ratio will take (i.e., 
greater or lesser than unity). 
It must be emphasized again that the dollar benefit-
cost ratio relies on a forecast of future dollar earnings. 
Calculation of a retention rate-effective tax ratio requires 
no such forecasting: both rates can be determined with cer-
tainty as they are derived from present data. 
This study calculates, on a county-wide. basis, for each 
of the four years previously mentioned, the following rates: 
1. The effective tax rate for public elementary and 
secondary education; 
2. The.retention rate for public elementary and sec-
conday education. 
After calculation of the preceding county-wide rates in 
Ohio and in Indiana, the tax rate per county in Ohio was 
compared with that of Indiana, using a one-way analysis of 
variance (with the political systems serving as treatments) 
to determine whether statistically significant differences 
existed between the states' tax rates for education. 
A one-way analysis of variance was also employed to de-
termine whether significant differences existed between re-
tention rates for education between Indiana and Ohio. 
Finally, benefit-cost ratios were constructed on a 
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state-wide basis for each year within the study by agg~egat­
ing the county ratios. The state-wide ratios were then com ... 
pared to determine the efficiency of providing the public 
good of education between the two differently-constructed 
political voting systems of Indiana and Ohio. 
Details of the analysis of variance procedure employed 
are presented in a subsequent section of this chapter; ex-
planations of the empirical test results are given in Chap-
ter IV of this study. 
The two sections of this chapter which immediately fol-
low provide a discussion of the assumptions behind as well 
as an illustration of the calculations for the cost and ben-
efit surrogates of public elementary and secondary education 
used in this study. 
The Tax Costs of Public Elementary 
And Secondary Education 
The costs of financing elementary and secondary educa-
tion as determined at the county-uide level, are met by 
revenues generated through property taxation in Indiana and 
Ohio. Property subject to taxation is classified by both 
states as being real, personal and public utility. 
Appendix A, Table XVIII, shows the extent to which 
school districts in Indiana and Ohio are locally financed. 
Table XIX of the same appendix, v;rhich presents school fi-
nancing in terms of local revenues only, illustrates the 
great extent to which such revenues.are derived from a 
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single source of taxation: the property tax. 
In terms of taxing property, most taxing localities 
levy a tax rate based upon assessed value of the property in 
question. This assessed value, in turn, is only a fraction 
of the property's true market value. Thus, the tax equation 








x Value of 
Property 
Because assessment ratios (assessed value as a percent-
age of market value) may differ from locality to locality, 
no valid comparison of tax rates can be made using the above 
equation's nominal tax rate. 
However, one can standardize the comparison of property 
tax policies by looking, not at nominal tax rates applied to 
assessed values of property, but at the effective property 
tax rates as follows: 
Effective Tax Rate Property Tax Revenues Fair Market Value of Property 
An effective tax rate gives a more realistic portrayal of 
the economic impact of a tax upon the taxpayer. 





Tax Rate X 
Fair Harket Value 
of Property 
As detailed in Appendix A, only a portion (albeit, a 
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substantial portion in Indiana and Ohio) of such property 
tax revenue goes toward financing education; the rest being 
diverted towards the funding of other public expenditures 
such as police and fire protection or road maintenance. 
For both states in this study, taxes on real property 
(land and land-based structures), as distinct from those on 
personal or public utility property, represent the largest 
source of local funding for public elementary and secondary 
education. 
Table I and II compare the assessed values for the 
three components of taxable property in Indiana and Ohio for 
the four years of this study. It should be noted that local 
taxes for education in both states are applied at the same 
rate to each category of property: real, personal and util-
ity. Thus, the category of property with the greatest as-
sessed value (real property) will also be the category which 
generates the largest amount of tax revenues for education. 
In addition to serving as the largest contributor of 
local tax revenues for public elementary and secondary edu-
cation, real property is readily adaptable to calculations · 
for effective tax rates, for which a fair market value of 
property must be employed. Both Indiana and Ohio have con-
ducted assessment-sales price ratio studies throughout the 
years on real property. The outcome of such studies, as de-
tailed in the following section, will be used in this paper 
to generate fair market values for real property in the cal-

















GROSS ASSESSED PROPERTY VALUES IN INDIANA 
FOR 1964, 1967, 1971 AND 1976 
Total, ~eal All Types of Personal 
Property Property Property 
$ 9,812.7 $ 6,179.8 $2,573.6 
100% 62.9% 26.2% 
-
$11,043.3 $ 7,022.8 $2 '94-7. 1 
100% 63.6% ' 26.7% 
$13,114.7 $ 9,286.5 $2,626.5 
100% 70.8% 20.0% 
$16,400.4 $10,984.0 $3,935.5 













Source: The State of Indiana, Annual Report of The Auditor of 



















GROSS ASSESSED PROPERTY VALUES IN OHIO 
FOR 1964, 1967, 1971 AND 1976 
Total, 
All Types 
of Real Personal 
Property Property Property 
$31,835.8 $20,375.1 $ 7,236.6 
100% 64.0% 22.7% 
$35,663.2 $22,134.9 $ 9,010.5 
100/o 62.1% 25.3% 
$41,785.8 $25,543.2 $10,827.1 
100% 61.1% 25.9% 
$60,247.8 $39,544.9 $13,578.7 
















Since there exists no equivalent assessment-sales price 
ratio studies for either personal or public utility proper-
ties, these two sources of local tax revenues for education 
were not adaptable to this study on effective tax rates and 
hence were not used in this study. 
For purposes of this study, then, the effective tax 
rate of interest is illustrated below. This is the rate at 
which individuals are taxed, or tax themselves on real prop-
erty, in order to supply the public good of elementary and 
secondary education. 
Effective 
Local Real Property = 
Tax Rate for Education 
School Operating Revenues 
From Local Real Property Taxes 
Fair Market Value of Locally 
Taxable Real Property 
The taxpaying public will tend to vie\v the real proper-
ty tax revenues diverted to education as being synonymous 
with the costs of education; hence, the effective tax rate 






Real Property Tax Rate x 
for Education 
Or, in a simpler form: 
c = T 





Rc = effective tax rate for education (or tax 
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rate associated with costs) 
T = tax base 
The following section details the precise procedures 
employed in this study to calculate the costs of public ele-
mentary and secondary education in Indiana. 
Calculation of the Costs in Indiana 
Local Costs of Education: Real Property Taxes. For 
both states in this study, the local costs were defined as 
operating costs for the public school systems; hence, taxes 
levied for building funds (which would occur on an irregular 
schedule) are not included in the cost calculations. 
In Indiana, the following values were obtained from the 
annual reports of the Auditor of the State for 1964, 1967, 
1971 and 1976 (41): 
Assessed value of"-,:all property (real, personal and 
utility) in Indiana, per county 
Assessed value of real property in Indiana, per co1.ll1ty 
School operating taxes levied on all sources of proper-
ty, per county 
The assessed values of real property utilized in this 
study are gross values, i.e., before deduction for exemptions 
from taxation for such reasons as age, low income levels or 
religion. Since such deductions vary from state to state, 
a standardized picture of a state's ability to provide edu-
cation through property taxation could only be achieved 
through use of gross values. 
School operating taxes generated from real property 
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taxes in Indiana were derived by establishing the following 
equation: 
Real Property 
as a Percentage 
of All Property 
School Operating 




Taxes Levied on 
Real Property 
In application, the above equation is restructured as 
follows: 
School Operating 










Local Tax Base for Education: Fair Market Value. In 
order to compute Indiana's effective tax rate on real prop-
erty for education, the school operating taxes on real prop-
erty calculation presented above had to be coupled with the 






School Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real Property 
Fair Market Value 
of Real Property 
The following procedures were employed to calculate the 
fair market value of real' property component of the above 
equation: assessed values for real property, on a county-
wide basis within Indiana, were divided by a county-wide as-
sessment-sales price ratio. The equation that describes 
this computation is as follows: 
Fair Market Value 
of Real Property 
Assessed Value, Real Property 
Assessment-Sales Price Ratio 




= Assessed Value, Real Prope~~ Sales Price, Real Property 
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Rearranging the preceding equation results in the following: 
Fair Market 










Thus, fair market value of real property in this study is 
synonymous with sales price of real property. 
Assessment-Sales Price Ratios 
Assessment-sales price ratios in Indiana, as in any 
other state that asse~)les such data, are derived by compar-
ing selling prices of real property with the respective as-
sessed values of such properties. During ar.y one year, only 
a portion of a state's total assessed real property will be 
involved in a sale; thus, the assessment-sales price ratio 
which is generated for that year is a reflection of only 
that portion of the state involved in the sale. In other 
words, the sales universe constitutes only a small percent-
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age of all realty in the state. 
Use of an assessment-sales price ratio, derived as it 
is from a subset of all possible sales, to compute the fair 
market value of all real property calls for a degree of cau-
tion in viewing this outputted value. The resultant fair 
market value is an estimate, though one that must be char-
acterized as the best possible estimate of such a value that 
is obtainable under real-world conditions. 
In this study, the 1971 and 1976 assessment-sales price 
ratios for Indiana and Ohio counties were taken from the 
Census of Governments (44) because the state of Indiana, as 
has been previously mentioned, discontinued its own program 
of generating such ratios in 1967. The 1967 ratios for Ind-
iana were taken directly from state documents; however, the 
1964 Indiana county ratios are the result of an averaging 
process. 
Because county-wide data necessary to compute the bene-
fits for education were obtainable in Indiana only for the 
years 1964 onward, cost calculations had to be restructured 
to fit this time period as well. Actual county-wide assess-
ment-sales price ratios in Indiana were available for 1963 
and 1967 only. The 1964 assessment-sales price ratios for 
each of Indiana's ninety-two counties which were employed in 
this paper were derived by subtracting from the 1963 assess-
ment-sales price ratio the average percentage decrease in 
the county's assessment-sales price ratio from 1963 to 1967. 












l/4 the Gross 
Difference 
Between 1963 
and 1967 Ratios 
Such a calculation makes the assumption that there was 
a proportionate yearly decrease in county assessment-sales 
price ratios in Indiana over the time period 1963 to 1967. 
This assumption may be better illustrated by looking at 
actual data for the state as a whole. In 1963, the assess-
ment-sales price ratio for the state of Indiana was .264 
(or, the assessed value of real property \-las 26.4% of sales 
·price); in 1967, the ratio was .237. Thus, from 1963 to 
1967, the assessment-sales price ratio declined, in aggre-
gate, .027. Assuming a proportionate and cumulative decline 
throughout each of the four years in this period, assess-
ment-sales ratios for the entire state would be calculated 
for 1964 to 1966 as follows: 
1964 ratio = 1963 ratio less %(change in ratio: 63-67) 
= .26400 - :!t(.027) 
= .25725 
1965 ratio = 1964 ratio less %(change in ratio: 63-67) 
/ 
= .25725 - %(.027) 
.25050 
1966 ratio = 1965 ratio less .\(change in ratio: 63-67) 
= .25050 - %(. 02"7) 
= .24375 
Thus, the following assessment-sales price ratios would re-












The assumption of a proportionately decreasing assess-
ment-sales price ratio in this research results in a fixed 
expectation as to the behavior of market prices for real 
property over the same time period. Because one of the com-
ponents of the assessment-sales price ratio, the assessed 
value of real property, is known. with certainty, the behav-
ior of market prices (the other component of the ratio) can 
be deduced, given the proportionately declining ratio as-
sumption. 
In other words, the change in the assessment-sales 
price ratio is composed of the changes in the individual 
components of the ratio: the assessed value of real prop-
erty and the sales price of real property. If one knows the 
direction of change (increase or decrease) in the assessed 
value and stipulates the direction of change in the ratio as 
a whole, one has also fixed the direction and amount of 
change in the sales price. 
Table III, which is presented on the next page, serves 
to illustrate the behavior of the ratio components. In e-
quation form, the preceding discussion may be stated as: 
Assessment-
Sales Price Ratio = 
~ Assessed Value 
6. Sales Price 


















ASSESSMENT- SALES PRICE RATIO COl1PONENTS 
IN INDIANA, 196L} AND 196 7 
Percentage 
Change, 
1964 1967 1964-1967 
$ 6,179,751,444 $ 7,022,833,060 13.64265% 
(increase) 
.25725 .237 7.8717 '1o 
(decrease) 
$24,022, 35 T, 410 $29,632,207,000 23.3526 '1o 
(increase) 
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Source: Gross assessed values are from The State of Indiana, 
Annual Report of the Auditor of the State of Indiana, 
(Indianapolis, 1964 and 1967), pp. 181 and 86, respectively. 
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Rearranging the preceding equation to solve for sales price: 
Sales Price = (1 +L Assessed Value) - (1 + 6 Ratio) (1 + D Ratio) 
Using the data from page 52 in the above equation gives the 
following results: 




= .233526 (rounded) 
If the research is to be founded on the assumption that 
Indiana's total fair market value of real property increased 
23.35% over the period 1964-67 (and did so proportionately), 
it would be reassuring to be able to cite comparable in-
creases in real property in other areas which occurred dur-
ing this time period. There exists, hovJever, no so1.:rce for 
determining fair market value for all real property; the 
closest equivalents are federal government studies on the 
median sales prices of new homes (46, p. 92). wnile new 
homes comprise only a portion of the real property an~a, one 
might use both the direction and magnitude of change in new 
homes' selling prices as an indication of market change for 
all real property. 
From 1964-1967, median sales prices of new one-family 
houses in the U.S. increased 20.11%. Median sales prices of 
such homes in the north central region (which includes Indi·-
ana and Ohio) increased 29.38% (46, p. 92). The 23.35% in-
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crease calculated for all real property in Indiana on page 
52 of this study is certainly in the same direction of 
change as the federal government figures; again, comparison 
of magnitude of change is hampered because the federal fig-
ures deal with only new houses, which comprise only a por-
tion of all real property available for sale. 
As more research is conducted in this area, there will 
doubtlessly be less of a need to rely on assumptions such as 
proportionately declining assessment-sales price ratios; for 
the present time, however, progress in this field would be 
·nonexistent without utilization of these assumptions. 
Cost Calculation Data in Indiana. The actual data in-
puts for the cost computations in Indiana are presented in 
Table XLIV of Appendix C. Details on assessment-sales price 
ratio computations for 1964, on a county-wide basis, are 
given in Table XLV of Appendix C. 
The follmving section enumerates the procedures fol-
lowed for cost calculations in the state of Ohio for the 
four years encompassed by this study. 
Calculation of the Costs in Ohio 
In Ohio, the following values were obtained from the 
Department of Tax Equalization for the years between 1964 
and 1976, except where noted: 
Assessed value of real property in Ohio, per county 
Assessment-sales price ratios in Ohio, per county 
(years 1964, 1966 and 1967 were not available) 
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In addition, annual millage rates for school operating 
tax levies were obtained from the following sources: 
Ohio Education Association, for the years 1964-1972 
Ohio State Department of Education, Division of School 
Finance, for the years 1972-76 
School operating taxes generated from real property 
taxes in Ohio were derived for each county through the fol-
lowing equation: 
School Operating 






X Value of 
Real Property 
The operating millage rate employed in the above equation is 
a simple average of all operating millage rates in the 
school districts comprising each county; this is the proce-
dure followed by the Division of School Finance in Ohio to 
generate county-wide millage rates. 
Local Tax Base for Education: Fair Market Value. Fair 
market value of real property in Ohio, on a county-wide ba ... 
sis was calculated as has been previously detailed for coun-




_-0ssessed Value, Real Property 
Assessment-Sales Price Ratio 
Thus, the effective local tax rate for education in 
Ohio is constructed as is that of Indiana's. The equation 
for this effective local t.::1x rate for education in Ohio is 






School Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real Property 
Fair Market Value 
of Real Property 
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The above equation, again, is computed on a county-wide 
basis for both states. 
Assessment-Sales Price Ratios in Ohio. In Ohio, as in 
the state of Indiana, the nonavailability of assessment-
sales price ratios for certain years necessitated employing 
certain assumptions in order to proceed with the study. In 
Ohio's case, assessment-sales price ratios were not avail-
able from the Department of Tax Equalization for the years 
1964, 1966 and 1967, although the department did have such 
ratios for all other years in the period 1964 through 1976. 
Accordingly, the assumption of proportionately declin-
ing assessment-sales price ratios detailed earlier for the 
state of Indiana was also adopted for the state of Ohio. 
Ohio's state-wide average assessment-sales price ratio had 
declined, much like Indiana's had, during the middle 1960's 
(from .3878 in 1963 to .3393 in 1968, or a decline of· 
12.5%). 
The 1964 assessment-sales price ratios for Ohio em-
ployed in this study were established as the mid-points be-
tween 1964 and 1965 county assessment-sales price ratios; 
the 1967 assessment-sales price ratios for counties were 
calculated in much the same manner as was done for counties 
in Indiana in 1964. The procedure for calculating Ohio's 
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1967 assessment-sales price ratios is illustrated as fol-
lows: 
1967 Assessment-
Sales Price Ratio, 
Per County 
1968 Assessment-






The data used to generate 1964 and 1967 assessment-
sales price ratios for the Ohio counties is detailed in Ta-
bles XLVIII and XLIX of Appendix D, which also furnish 
numerical examples of the calculations employed. 
The Benefits of Public Elementary 
and Secondary Education 
It is impossible to isolate benefits of education as 
they are perceived by individual taxpayers. Taxpayers might 
accede to being taxed for education because they have chil-
dren in the schools, because they possess a feeling of "pub-
lie regardiness" or altruism, because of peer pressure, 
because "experts" tout the benefits of education to them or 
because they themselves are employed by school systems. 
Instead of trying to define the individual's assessment 
of educational benefits, one can look at the aggregate costs 
of education as born by the taxpayers (the school district 
revenues supplied by property taxes) and adjudge the aggre-
gate benefits of education to be the promulgation of future 
taxpayers, by assuming that the educational process will 
produce future workers who will in turn shoulder a share of 
the tax burdens. 
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Following this line of reasoning, the expenditures of 
educating, say, first grade students in any one year may be 
thought of as buying the following amount of benefits: 
Where 
and 
Total Benefit of Education = $A plus $B 
$A = 
$B = 
Number of Students 
Dropping Out of 
First Grade 




X Incremental Earnings 
of Persons With Less 
Than a First Grade 
Education 
Discounted Future 
X Incremental Earnings 
of Persons With a 
First Grade Education 
However, the suppliers of educational financing (the 
taxpayers) are "buying" the future bene.fits that accrue to 
studnets who remain in school, not the benefits that might 
accrue to those students who drop out. 
Although one might argue that there might be some bene-
fits accruing to drop-outs because educational funds have 
been expended on them prior to their dropping-out, determin-
ing the extent of such benefits would require knowledge of 
the exact date of a student's withdrawal from school in or-
der to calculate the monies expended on that student. 
This study assumes that the costs of educating students 
who remain in the schools for the majority of the school 
year only to drop out prior to completion of the year are 
balanced by the savings that result from not having to spend 
funds on students who drop out early in the year. The 
school system which has budgeted funds to educate such early 
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drop-outs is thus free to allocate the savings among the re-
maining students. 
Past research on the benefits of education has estab-
lished that a correlation exists between the number of years 
of schooling completed by a person and the wage levels 
earned by that person. The amount of money expended for 
public education, following such reasoning, may be expected 
to produce a greater amount of benefits if the school system 
receiving such funding has a correspondingly high rate of 
retention for its enrollees. The retention rate of the 
school system, then, becomes one key to the amount of future 
benefits that will accrue to a polity as a result of educa-
tional spending: the higher the retention rate, the greater 
the amount of benefits (future incomes of enrollees) 
The preceding definition of benefits, of course, rests 
on the assumption that education levels and earning capaci-
ties of individuals are positively associated. The U.S. 
Census data points to a strong positive correlation between 
levels of education achieved and levels of income earned; 
however, as in all correlation studies, no causal relation-
ship can be presumed to underlie this relationship. The 
greater earning capability of the highly-educated may just 
as easily be attributed to other socioeconomic factors in 
their backgrounds which were independent of the educational 
process. 
However, as previous educational efficiency studies 
have pointed out: "the effect of education remains by far 
the most important factor in determining earnings differ-
entials" (10, p. 151). 
Utilization of retention rates as a measure of educa-
tional benefits with the implicit linkage of such rates to 
future income levels of students does not appear to be a 
gross misstatement of the benefits side of the educational 
process. 
60 
Procedurally, this study will show that if retention 
rates for education are in excess of the tax rates used to 
generate funds for education, a positive (i.e., greater than 
unity) benefit-cost ratio will result, v1hich, as in all ben-
efit-cost studies, can be used as a comparative measure in 
studying alternative means of providing education. 
One advantage of using retention rates as benefit meas-
ures lies in their ready availability. More importantly, 
however, use of retention rates in a benefit-cost study does 
not result in total reliance on projections of future income 
streams, the dollar value of ·which may differ from research-
er to researcher, depending upon the assumptions made by 
each as to inflation rates, wage raises, mortality factors 
and discount rates. 
Thus, use of retention rates may eliminate the possi:.. 
bility of making decisions based upon dollar "guess-timates" 
as to the future benefits of education. Hhile use of rates, 
it is true, will generate no picture of the magnitude of 
dollar benefits which may accrue to educated workers, the 
benefit-cost ratio constructed with rates (retention rate 
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and tax rate) will provide the user with an indication as to 
whether benefits from education are likely to exceed the 
costs of such education--as to whether the benefit-cost ra-
tio is positive, or greater than one. The benefit-cost ra-
tio based on rates, in other words, is indicative as to 
whether output of the educational process will exceed the in-
put, but the ratio takes the conservative step of stopping 
far short of attaching a dollar amount to this excess. The 
reader, if so inclined, is free to attach a real dollar 
measure of benefits to the ratio, hopefully with the reali-
zation that justification for such a measure rests solely 
with her or him. 
Furthermore, calculation of the retention rate may be 
done with data that is, by definition, "hard" data: by 
viewing educational costs in a historical context, retention 
rates associated with expenditures may be calculated by re-
£erring to the enrollment figures of the years both encom-
passing and succeeding the expenditure year. 
The measure of benefits which accrues to the funding of 





















Year of School 
When the above equation is restructured in a simpler 
format, the equation presented on page 62 is then produced. 
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B = 
Where: B dollar benefits of education 
1ft = number of pupils 
Rb = retention rate (or, rate associated with bene-
fits) 
I = discounted future earnings associated with ed-
ucation 
The yearly local expenditure for education buys the to-
tal benefits inherent in retaining students in grades one 
through t\velve for an entire year (or: buys the possibility 
·that first graders of this year will stay in school to be-
come second graders next year, and so forth). In other 
words, a county expends monies for education in the hopes of 
obtaining the benefits of moving all students presently en-
rolled ~ by one grade level (first to second, second to 
third and so on). 
In this study, a one-year lag is assumed to occur be-
tween the passage of school operating tax levies and the ap-
plication of the tax funds to the educational system. Tax 
levies assessed against real property in 1964, for example, 
would not be collected and available in cash form for the 
use of schools until 1965. Thus, the relevent benefit rate 
is that derived from total enrollments in the two years fol-
lowing the tax levy year, or: 
Total Retention 
Rate 
=Number of Students in Grades 2-12, Time 2 
Number of Students -:[1]_ Grades 1-11, Time 1 
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12 
2: X. 2 
= i=2 ~. 
11 
~ X. 1 
i=l ~. 
Where: X number of students enrolled 
i = grade level 
1,2 time periods (Time 0 would be tax levy year) 
Calculation of the Benefits in Indiana 
The following information was obtained from the Depart-
ment of Public Instruction, Division of Educational Informa-
tion and Research in Indiana: 
Public school enrollments, by grade level, per county 
for the years 1964 through 1978 
The enrollment figures used to generate county-wide re-
tention rates were fall semester gross enrollment figures. 
For purposes of this study, only students in graded classes 
were included in retention rate computations; students en-
rolled in nursery or kindergarden section, in special educa-
tion classes, in ungraded sections or in post-high school 
graduate classes were not included. 
Actual calculation of retention rates proceeded as fol-
lows for both Indiana and Ohio (again, assuming a one year 
lage between the levying of real property taxes and the in-
clusion of such tax funds in school budgets): 
1964 Retention Rate = Enrollment, Grades 2-12 in 1966 Enrollment, Grades 1-11 in 1965 
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1967 Retention Rate Enrollment 1 Grades 2-12 in 1969 = Enrollment, Grades 1-11 in 1968 
1971 Retention Rate Enrollment, Grades 2-12 in 1973 = Enrollment, Grades 1-11 in 1972 
1976 Retention Rate Enrollment, Grades 2-12 in 1978 = Enrollment, Grades 1-11 in 1977 
Calculation of the Benefits in Ohio 
Inputs for retention rates in Ohio were taken from the 
fall enrollment figures supplied by the Department of Educa-
tion, Division of Computer Services and Statistical Reports, 
. in Ohio. As in Indiana, the following were obtained: 
Public school enrollments, by grade level, per county 
for the years 1964 through 1978 
Actual calculation of retention rates for 1964, 1967, 
1971 and 1976 for Ohio counties followed the same procedure 
detailed previously for counties in Indiana. 
The actual county enrollment figures used to generate 
the retention rates for Ohio and Indiana in this study are 
contained in the tables found in Appendixes C and D. 
The following section of this chapter details the sta-
tistical methods employed in this study to test the research 
hypotheses stated at the onset of this chapter. 
Statistical Procedures Employed 
in the Analysis of the Data 
Each of the years studied in this research paper com-
prised a separate testing ground for the two research hy-
potheses detailed on page 34 of this chapter. The 
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structuring of the research design along cross-sectional 
lines was done in order to eliminate problems inherent in 
time series analysis of successive years (see Appendix B). 
Within each of the four years (1964, 1967, 1971 and 
1976) covered by this study, a one-way analysis of variance 
was conducted, using as the treatment effect (or independ-
ent variables) the two different political structures--the 
states of Indiana and Ohio 
The two dependent variables regressed on the Ohio and 
Indiana independent variables were those of R (the effec-c 
·tive tax rate) and Rb (the retention rate). 
Because the number of counties per treatment (state) 
differed within each year, the one-way ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) became an analysis for two groups having unequal 
replication (40, p. 112). 
As Steel and Torrie (40, p. 252) point out, where data 
in a one-way ANOVA is structured such that there are unequal 
numbers of observations per treatment, the treatment sum of 
· d f · d L. ·c- - ' 2 d · d squares lS e lne as . n. x.-x an lS compute as l l l. .• 
L. 2 2 . (x. /n.) - x /n. l lo l •• 
Treatment sum of squares in this situation is a weighted 
sum of squares of the deviations from the overall mean x, 
which by itself is a weighted average of treatment means 
(the weights are reciprocals of al;n., the variance). Error 
l 
sum of squares for this single factor experiment (considered 
on a per year basis) is the sum of the within-treatment sum 
of squares. 
Or, in equation form, total sum of squares can be ex-






E 2: (X .. -
1 1 ~J 
- 2 X .. ) 
number of treatments 
number of observations per treatment 
number assigned to a particular observation 
number assigned to a particular treatment 
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Total sum of squares, as previously noted, may be par-
titioned into two different sums of squares: 
k n k n k 
[ 
1 
' - 2 ~ (Xij - X .. ) = ~ I: (X .. - x.J.) 2 + n L (X .. - X .. ) 2 
1 1 ~J 1 J 
The first term on the right of the equals sign, in a one-
way ANOVA, is the error sum of squares; the second term is 
the between groups sum of squares (25, pp. 46, 47). 
In graphic form, the one-way analysis of variance for 
each year in the study would take the form illustrated in 
Figure 1 on page 67. Figure 1 shows the procedure under-
taken to test the null hypothesis that there is no differ-
ence between effective tax rates for education between 
differently-constructed polities. 
Figure 2, also shown on the following page, illustrates 
the procedure undertaken to test the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference between retention rates for education 
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Treatments 
(different political voting systems) --
Indiana Ohio 
Dependent R IS for R Is for 
[variables c counties c counties 
Figure 1. ANOVA on effective tax rates 
Treatments 
(different political voting systems 
Indiana Ohio 
Dependent Rb Is fOJ? ~ 1 S fOJ? 
Variables countles countles 
Figure 2. ANOVA on retention rates 
between differently-constructed polities. 
Within each year of the study, two single-factor ANOVAs 
were performed, one using the dependent variable Rc and an-
other using the dependent variable Rb, resulting in a total 
of eight ANOVAs. 
To process the ANOVA calculations, the ANOVA procedure 
of SAS (Statistical Analysis System) was employed. While 
SAS's procedure for ANOVA is set up for analysis of balanced 
designs (4, p. 57), it may be used to analyze certain de-
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signs whose cell frequencies are proportional to each other 
and, in addition, are proportional to the background popula-
tion. The present research design, structured as it is a-
long one-way ANOVA lines, fits within these proportional 
qualifications. 
State-Hide Measures of Efficiency 
After ANOVA had been performed on the t~..;ro dependent 
variables Rc and ~ within each state for each year of the 
study, benefit-cost ratios were constructed on a state-wide 
basis for each year by comparing the aggregate county ratios 
for Rc and Rb . 
In comparing the efficiency levels of the two states, 
it was initially expected that one of five situations could 
result yearly: 
1. Rb Indiana =f Rb Ohio 
and 





Ohio -r -r c c 
If tax rates for education for a given year v7ere not signif-
icantly different between Ohio and Indiana as determined 
from the ANOVA on Rc, but significant differences existed 
between the states' retention rates (as determined from the 
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Rb ANOVA), the resulting benefit-cost ratio difference could 
not be attributed to the educational financing policies. 
Rather, the difference could have been attributable only to 
the operational efficiencies between the two education sys-
terns. 
2. Rb Indiana ~ Ohio = 
and 
R Indiana f 
R Ohio c c 
so that 
~ Indiana f 1\ Ohio If""" ~ c c 
If the tax rates of the two states were significantly dif-
ferent, but the retention rates were not, the system with 
the higher tax rate ~vas inefficient in using its educational 
funds. 
3. Rb Indiana ·~ Ohio 
and 
R Indiana R Ohio c = c 
so that 
Rb 
Indiana = ~ Ohio -r -r c c 
If neither the tax rates nor the retention rates of the two 
states were significantly different, both states had effici-
ent systems of financing education and of operating their 
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public elementary and secondary schools. 
4. Rb Indiana t ~Ohio 
and 
R Indiana t R Ohio c c 
so that 
Rb 
Indiana t 1\ Ohio 11 11 c c 
If both the tax rates and the retention rates were different 
and the resulting benefit-cost ratio was also different, the 
efficiency difference was due to a combination of both 
school financing and operational factors and identification 
of the specific cause would not be possible. 
5. ~ Indiana t ~Ohio 
and 
R Indiana I 
R Ohio c c 
so that 
Rb 
Indiana = ~ Ohio R.- 11 c c 
If both the tax rates and the retention rates differed be-
tween the states but the benefit-cost ratio did not, the 
conclusion reached on page 69 in example three must hold; 
however, neither the method of financing schools nor that of 
operating them can be isolated as the specific determinant 
of efficiency. 
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The following chapter presents the empirical results 
obtained by applying the methodology detailed in this chap-
ter to the data and analyzes the implications of such re-
sults within the confines of this study. 
CHAPTER IV 
ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 
OF THE DATA 
Introduction 
For each of the four years (1964, 1967, 1971 and 1976) 
.encompassed by this study, two separate analyses of variance 
were performed: one testing for significant differences be-
tween Indiana's and Ohio's county-wide retention rates for 
public elementary and secondary education (Rb) and a second 
testing for significant differences between the two states' 
county-wide effective tax rates (Rc) for school operations 
which are derived from real property. 
After this separate analysis of the two components of 
the benefit-cost ratio, the county-wide Rbs and Res were 
each summed and a state-wide benefit-cost ratio produced, 
using the average retention rate and tax rate for each : 
state. 
This chapter details the results of the eight ANOVA 
performed in addition to presented the four state-wide bene-
fit cost ratios. 
The 1964 Test Results 
In 1964, information on school enrollment was obtained 
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from all 92 counties in Indiana and all 88 counties in Ohio. 
The actual data inputs are listed in the data tables of Ap-
pendixes C and D. 
ANOVA on Rb (Retention Rate) 
The results of the one-way analysis of variance for 
1964, as generated by the ANOVA procedure of SAS (4), are 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rb 
(RETENTION RATE) FOR 1964 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0. 0013/+385 
Error 178 0.15897390 





The calculated F statistic is 1.50 (mean square treat-
ment divided by mean square error); the probability of ob-
taining an F value greater than this is .2216, or, the 
observed significance level in this case is .7754. The con-
elusion reached is that there is no significant difference 
(at ~.05 or less) in retention ability of Indiana's and 
Ohio's public elementary and secondary education institu-
tions for 1964, on the basis of this study's methodology. 
ANOVA on Rc (Effective Tax Rate) 
The results of the one-way analysis of variance on R 
c 




ANALYSIS OF VARIAI:~CE ON Rc 
(EFFECTIVE TAX RATE) FOR 1964 





Treatment (States) 1 0.00001404 0.00001404 
Error 178 0.00025508 0.00000143 
Corrected Total 179 0.00026911 
The F value calculated from the above data was 9.80, 
with the probability of obtaining an F value greater than 
this being .002. The observed significance level in this 
instance is .998, leading to the conclusion that there is a 
significant difference ( ex. 01) between the level of taxa-
tion in Indiana and Ohio. 
Further examination of state-wide means generated by 
the ANOVA procedure on Rc reveals the following: 
1964 mean of Rc in Indiana = .. 00638376 
1964 mean of R in Ohio c = .00694242 
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In 1964, the direct voting state, Ohio, had a signifi-
cantly higher effective tax rate for education than did tpe 
indirect voting polity of Indiana. 
The State-Hide Benefit-Cost Ratio 
Constructing a state-wide benefit-cost ratio for 1964 
from the mean Rb and Rc of each state (obtained by taking an 
average of the aggregated county values for Rb and Rc, re-
_spectively) leads to the following results: 
Rb Indiana 
R Indiana c 
Rb Ohio 
R Ohio c 





Thus, in reference to Chapter III's discussion of pos-
sible outcomes for this study (pp. 68-70), the above situa-
tion may be written as follows: 






1\ R Ohio 
c 
In 1964, the state of Indiana was more efficient in 
utilizing tax funds from real property to fund public ele-
mentary and secondary education. 
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Further details on the state-wide mean Rb and Rc for 
Indiana and Ohio, including the standard deviation from such 
means, are available in Table L of Appendix E. 
The 1967 Test Results 
1967 test results on Rb and Rc were, like those of 
1964's obtained from all 92 counties in Indiana and all 88 
counties in Ohio. Actual data inputs are listed in the data 
tables of Appendixes C and D. 
ANOVA on Rb (Retention Rate) 
Table VI, which is presented on the following page, 
presents the 1967 results for the 1\ analysis of variance. 
The F value calculated from the data in Table VI was 2.69. 
The observed significance level in this instance was .8971 
(or, the probability of obtaining a greater F value was 
.1029); there is no significant difference (at ~.05 or 
less) in retention ability between the two different politi-
cal voting systems of Indiana and Ohio in 1967. 
ANOVA on R (Effective Tax Rate) 
-------c~------------------~ 
Table VII, which is presented on the following page, 
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ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rb 
(RETENTION RATE) FOR 1967 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 








ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rc 
(EFFECTIVE TAX RATE) FOR 1967 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0.00005058 
Error 178 0.00029937 









The F value for Table VII was 30.07, with the probabil-
ity of obtaining a value greater than this by chance being 
.0001. The observed significance level is thus .9999, which 
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is indicative of a very significant difference ( ex . 01) be-
tween the effective tax rates in Indiana and Ohio for 1967. 
Examination of the state-wide means for R in 1967 c 
shows the following: 
= .00821054 1967 mean of Rc in Indiana 
1967 mean of R in Ohio = .00715011 
c 
Thus, in 1967, the indirect voting state of Indiana had 
a significantly higher effective tax rate for education than 
did the direct voting state of Ohio. 
The State-Wide Benefit-Cost Ratio 
Using state-wide averages of Rb and Rc, the 1967 bene-
fit-cost ratio for each state appears below: 
Rb Indiana 
R Indiana c 
1\ Ohio 
Rc Ohio 
= .98613684 .00821054 
= 120.1062098 
= . 98125352 .00715011 
= 137.2361432 
Thus, the following situation exists in 1967: 








In 1967, the state of Ohio was more efficient in fund-
ing public elementary and secondary education from taxes 
levied on real property than was the state of Indiana. 
The 1971 Test Results 
For 1971, the number of counties fron1 which information 
was obtained totaled 33 in Indiana and 48 in Ohio. Actual 
data are shown in the data tables of Appendixes C and D. 
ANOVA on Rb (Retention Rate) 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rb 
(RETENTION RATE) FOR 1971 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0.00000084 
Error 79 0.04664957 






For the data presented in Table VIII, the computed F 
statistic was 0.00, with an observed significance level of 
.03. The conclusion reached was that there was no signifi-
cant difference (at ~.05 or less) between retention rates 
of Indiana and Ohio in 1971. 
ANOVA on R (Effecti_ve Tax Rate) 
----------,c~------
Table IX presents the results of the k~OVA on R for c 
the year of 1971. 
TABLE IX 
ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rc 
(EFFECTIVE TAX RATE) FOR 1971 
Source Degrees of Sum of 
of Variance Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0.00000843 
Error 79 0.00015556 





Calculated F in the above case was 4.28 and the ob-
served significance level was .9583. At an alpha level of 
.OS, the conclusion could be reached that significant dif-
ferences existed between the two states' effective tax 
rates. 
For the year of 1971, the state-wide means for Rc 
for Indiana and Ohio are as follows: 
1971 mean of R in Indiana = .00914092 c 
1971 mean of R in Ohio = .00848416 c 
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Thus, in 1971, the state of Indiana had a significant-
ly higher (at ex. 05) effective tax rate for education than 
did the state of Ohio. 
The State-Wide Benefit-Cost Ratio 
The results of the state-wide comparisons of Rb and Rc 
in Indiana and Ohio are as follows: 
Rb Indiana 
R Indiana c 
Rb Ohio 
R Ohio c 
= .98378793 .00914092 
= 107.6246078 
= .98358050 . 00848L~l6 
= 115.9313945 
The following situation exists for the year of 1971: 
Rb Indiana ~ Ohio 
and 





Ohio R R c c 
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In 1971, the state of Ohio was more efficient in fund-
ing public elementary and secondary education with real 
property taxes than was the state of Indiana. 
The 1976 Test Results 
The 1976 test results were derived from information ob-
tained in 36 Indiana counties and 42 Ohio counties. Actual 
data employed are contained in Appendixes C and D of this 
study. 
ANOVA on Rb (Retention Rate) 
Table X presents the results of the ANOVA on Rb for 




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rb 
(RETENTION RATE) FOR 1976 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0.00043959 
Error 76 0.05502081 





The F value calculated from the above table was .61 and 
the observed significance level was .5617. No significant 
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difference (at 0< • 05 or less) was found between retention 
rates of the two states. 
ANOVA on R (Effective Tax Rate) 
c~----~· .~----------~ 
The results of the one-way analysis of variance on the 
effective tax rates in 1976 are presented in Table XI. The 
F value for the data in Table XI was 45.81, with the proba-
bility of obtaining an F value greater than this being 
.0001. The observed significance level was .9999; a signif-
icant difference ( 0( .01) exists in 1976 between the effec-




ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE ON Rc 
(EFFECTIVE TAX RATE) FOR 1976 
Degrees of Sum of 
Freedom Sguares 
Treatment (States) 1 0.00014343 
Error 76 0.00023795 





State-wide means for Rc in 1976 were as follows: 
1976 mean of R in Indiana = .00481038 c 
1976 mean of R in Ohio = .00753055 c 
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The state of Ohio, in 1976, had a significantly higher 
effective tax rate for education on real property than.did 
that of Indiana. 
The State-Hide Benefit-Cost Ratio 
The 1976 benefit-cost ratios for each state were gener-
ated as follows, using mean Rbs and Res for each state in 
the study: 
~ Indiana 
R Indiana c 
Rb Ohio 




















In 1976, the indirect voting state of Indiana was more 
efficient in funding public elementary and secondary educa-
tion with taxes on real property. 
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Interpretation of the Results 
Table XII presents the results of the statistical tests 
for the four years of this study in summary fashion. 
TABLE XII 
SUMMARY OF TEST RESULTS 
Dependent-- Signifi- No Signi- Tmr: Variable cant ficant Alpha Efficient Year Tested Difference Difference Level State 
1964 
Rb X .01 Indiana 
R X .01 c 
1967 
Rb X .011 Ohio 
I 
R X I c I .01 I 
~ 
I 
1971 i X .01 Ohio 
R I c X .OS 
1976 
Rb X .01 Indiana 
R X .01 c 
As Table XII reveals, differences between the two dif-
ferently-constructed voting systems do exist in terms of 
their effective tax rates for public elementary and second-
ary education, but no significant differences (at o<. OS or 
less) were observed in the two systems' retention rates for 
such educational systems. 
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In an atte.mpt to gain a better understanding of the 
differences in effective tax rates, this research examined 
the changes in the components of the school operating taxes 
in Indiana and Ohio from 1960-1976. 
School Operating Taxes 
As Chapter III of this research noted, the levying of 
a nominal tax rate upon the assessed value of real property 
determines the gross amount of tax dollars raised from that 














The gross amount of tax dollars, when divided by fair 
market value of real property, yields the effective tax rate 
which was the subject of this chapter's statistical testing. 
Because Indiana and Ohio are adjacent to one another 
geographically and because they were tested for demographic 
differences (other than those of political voting structure, 
as detailed in Appendix B), it does not appear likely that 
differences between the states in their effective tax rates 
for public elementary and secondary education would arise 
from differences in the fair market value of real property 
within each state. 
Rather, the difference in effective tax rates appears 
to have arisen from differences between the gross amount of 
taxes levied within the states. These differences, in turn, 
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may be attributed to changes, over time, in the components 
of the gross taxes, which are shown in the equation on page 
86. 
In order to isolate changes in gross tax components 
over time, the equation on page 86 was re-written in the 
follo1.ving manner: 
Hhere 
fo 6 = %6. Taxes Rate + 
% 6 Assessed 
Value 
+(%b. x %6-Assessed\ 
Rate Value J 
%~ = percentage change over time 
Taxes = school operating taxes levied on real prop-
erty 
Rate nominal tax rate on real property for school 
operation 
Assessed 
Value = assessed value of real property 
The following sections detail the observed changes in 
the total school operating tax components. 
1964 Differences in School Operating Taxes 
Results of the statistical tests presented earlier in 
this chapter indicated that Ohio had a higher effective tax 
rate (and hence, was less efficient) in 1964 for public ele-
mentary and secondary education than did Indiana. 
Viewing both states from the period 1960-1964, the 
changes noted in Table XIII on the following page were ob-
served. As Table XIII details, the largest component of 
Ohio's 35.283% increase in total school operating taxes from 
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Percentage Change 










in Nominal Tax Rate 
for School 3 
Operations 19.152% increase 
Percentage Change 
in Total School 
Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real 5 
Property 35.283% increase 
Indiana 
2 




43. 070/o increase 
1From $17,945,568,547 in 1960 to $20,375,129,865 in 1964. 
Source: Ohio Department of Tax Equalization, t!Valuation of 
Real Estate, Public Utilities and Tangible Personal Property 
for the Tax Years 1931 to 1977tl, Form V-1 (Columbus, 1977). 
2From $4,680,975,833 in 1960 to $6,179,751,444 in 1964. 
Source: Annual Report of the Auditor of the State of 
Indiana (Indianapolis, 1961; 1965). 
3From .0165 in 1960 to .01966 in 1964. Source: Ohio 
Education Association, Research and Development Division, 
Basic Financial Data of Ohio School Districts, 24, 2 
(Columbus, 1970), p. 8. 
4From .0245558 in 1960 to .0266121 in 1964. Derived by 
dividing total taxes by assessed values of real property. 
5From $296,101,881 in 1960 to $400,575,053 in 1964. 
Calculated by multiplying nominal tax rates against assessed 
values of real property. 
6From $114,945,046 in 1960 to $164,455,958 in 1964. 
Source: Annual Report of the Auditor, (Indiana, 1961;1965). 
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1960-1964 was the change ln nominal tax rates levied on real 
property. 
The selection of nominal tax rates in Ohio is the prov-
ince of the voters, while the fixing of assessed values for 
real property is determined by elected county assessors in 
that state. In 1964, for the state of Ohio, voters' actions 
apparently accounted for more of the increase in total 
school operating taxes (and by extension, accounted for more 
of the state's inefficiency in supplying the public good of 
elementary and secondary education) than did county asses-
·sors' actions in increasing assessed values of real property 
in the state. 
Although the 1964 total taxes in Indiana in Table XIII 
show a greater percentage increase than those of Ohio, it 
should be pointed out that the assessed values for real 
property in Indiana which were obtainable from the state 
auditor's annual report differ in their composition from 
1960 to 1964. The 1960 real property assessed values do not 
include real property of railroads and utilities; the 1964 
total value for real property incorporates railroad and 
utility real property. Inclusion of railroad and utility 
real property in 1960's assessed value for real property in 
Table XIII would reduce the 32.02% increase shown there; 
however, data were not available with which to compute the 
exact downward adjustment. 
The following page details the results of the 1967 
differences in school operating taxes that were observed. 
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1967 Differences in School Operating Taxes 
Statistical tests on 1967 effective tax rates in Indi-
ana and Ohio revealed that Indiana had a significantly high-
er (at an alpha of .01) rate than did Ohio. Table XIV on 
the next page presents changes in total operating tax com-
ponents for 1964-1967. 
The largest component underlying Indiana's 53.466% in-
crease in total school operating taxes from 1964-1967 was 
that of the change in nominal tax rates levied on real prop-
erty. Determination of nominal tax rates in Indiana is a 
function of school district officials; imposition of such 
rates does not require voter approval. 
1971 Differences in School Operating Taxes 
In 1971, the state of Indiana, according to this chap-
ter's statistical tests, had a higher effective tax rate for 
public education than did the state of Ohio. Table XV on 
page 92 presents the 1967-71 changes in total school operat-
ing tax components. 
During the period 1967-1971, the largest component of 
Indiana's 47.1% increase in total school operating taxes, as 
shown with Table XV, was the change in assessed values of 
real property. It should be noted that the difference be-
tween the two states' effective tax rates in 1971 was sig-
nificant only at an alpha level of .05 (observed signifi-
cance level was .9583), as compared to 196L~, 1967 and 1976 
differences in effective tax rates which were significant at 
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Percentage Change 









8. 6 37% increase 
in Nominal Tax Rate 
for School 3 
Operations 13.9369/o increase 
Percentage Change 
in Total School 
Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real 5 




53 .!+66% increase 




1967. Source: Ohio Department of Tax Equalization, Form V-1. 
2From $6,179,751,444 in 1964 to $7,022,833,069 in 1967. 
Source: Annual Report of the Auditor (Indiana, 1965;1968). 
3From .01966 in 1964 to .0224 in 1967. Source: Ohio 
Education Association, Basic Financial Data of Ohio School 
Districts, 24, 2 (Columbus, 1970), p. 8. 
4From .0266121 in 1964 to .03593761 in 1967. Derived 
by dividing total taxes by assessed values of real property. 
5From $400,575,053 in 1964 to $495,821,459 in 1967. 
Calculated by multiplying nominal tax rates against assessed 
values. 
6From $164,455,958 in 1964 to $252,383,812 in 1967. 
Source: Annual Report of the Auditor (Indiana, 1965; 1968). 
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Percentage Change 










in Nominal Tax Rate 
for School 3 
Operations 26.830% increase 
Percentage Change 
in Total School 
Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real 5 





1From $22,134,886,588 in 1967 to $25,543,258,521 in 





2From $7,022,833,069 in 1967 to $9,286,530,025 in 1971. 
Source: Anp.ual Report of the Auditor (Indiana, 1968; 1972). 
3From .0224 in 1967 to .02841 in 1971. Source: Ohio 
Education Association, Basic Financial Data of Ohio School 
Districts, 24,2 (Columbus, 1970), p. 8. 
4From .03593761 in 1967 to .03997897 in 1971. Derived 
by dividing total taxes by assessed values of real property. 
r:: 
~From $495,821,459 in 1967 to $725,683,975 in 1971. 
Calculated by multiplying nominal tax rates against assessed 
values of real property. 
6From $252,383,812 in 1967 to $371,265,879 in 1971. 
Source: Annual Report of the Auditor (Indiana, 1968; 1972). 
the ~.01 level. 1971's lower significance level can be 
visually corroborated by noticing that Ohio's percentage 
change in total school operating taxes (46.359% increase) 
for 1967-1971 closely paralleled that of Indiana's. 
1976 Differences in School Operating Taxes 
93 
In 1976, the state of Ohio had a higher effective tax 
rate for public elementary and secondary education than did 
Indiana. The table upon page 94 presents the 1971-1976 
changes in school operating tax components. 
From 1971-1976, the greatest portion of Ohio's 58.598/o 
increase in total school operating taxes from real property 
came from the state's increase in assessed values for real 
property. Changes in assessed values are attributable to 
actions by county assessors, rather than to any direct ac-
tion on the part of the citizenry. 
Sum..-rnary 
The previous sections' presentations of changes in the 
components of school operating taxes are sun~arized in Table 
XVII on page 95. 
The largest contributing factor to the change in total 
school operating taxes (and, by extension, to the change in 
effective tax rates) was, in three out of the four time per-
iods listed in Table XVII, that of the change in nominal tax 
rates for the state of Ohio. In Ohio, changes in nominal 
tax rates are attributable to voters' actions; much of the 
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54, 800/o increase 
in Nominal Tax Rate 
for School 3 
Operations 2. L~40% increase 
Percentage Change 
in Total School 
Operating Taxes 
Levied on Real 5 
Property 58.598% increase 
Indiana 
18.28% increase 
lLL 29% decrease 
1.37% increase 
1From $25,543,258,521 in 1971 to $39,544,886,946 in 





2From $9,286,530,025 in 1971 to $10,984,026,091 in 
1976. Source: Annual Report of the Auditor (Indiana, 1972; 
1977). 
3From .0310994 in 1971 to .0318593 in 1976. Calculated 
by dividing total school operating taxes by assessed values 
of real property. 
4From .03997897 in 1971 to .0342644 in 1976. Derived 
by dividing total taxes by assessed values of real property. 
5From $794,380,215 in 1971 to $1,259,874,018 in 1976. 
Calculated by multiplying average county operating millage 
rates against assessed values of real property, per county. 
See data in Appendix D. 
6From $371,265,879 in 1971 to $376,361,541 in 1976. 




MAJOR CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO CHANGE 
IN TOTAL SCHOOL OPERATING TAXES 
Ohio Indiana 
7~ 




I 1964 - 1967 Nominal Rate %!:::. Nominal Rate 
--:J:: 
" 1967 - 1971 %6 Nominal Rate fo~ Assessed Value 
--
"k 
1971 - 1976 %6, Assessed Value fo~ Assessed Value 
Where: 
-·--··- --~---
* - more efficient state (state with 
lowest effective tax rate) 
~oA h • h~ = percentage c ange over tlme 
Nominal Rate = nominal tax rate for school opera-
tions 
Assessed Value = assessed value of real property 
impetus behind the change in total school operating taxes in 
Ohio appears to have originated with the populace directly. 
In Indiana, by contrast, the largest contributing fac-
tor to the change in total school operating taxes was, in 
three of the four time periods listed in Table XVII, that of 
the change in assessed values of real property. County as-
sessors in Indiana are responsible for changing assessed 
values of real property. Thus, in Indiana, change in total 
school taxes may be largely attributable to alterations made 
by elected officials, the county assessors. 
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Efficiency in funding public elementary and secondary 
education through taxes on real property does not appear to 
be the sole province of any one political voting system 
structure. In two out of the four time periods listed in 
Table XVII, the direct voting state of Ohio was more effici-
ent (i.e., had a lower effective tax rate for education) 
than was the indirect voting state of Indiana in supplying 
the public good of elementary and secondary education; the 
situation reverses in the other two time periods. 
To better relate the statistical test results and the 
interpretation of these results reached in this chapter to 
the initial research questions posited at the start of this 
paper, the next chapter offers both a summary of the re-




Sill1HARY, CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Summary 
The impc:tus for this research originated with the pas-
age of California's Proposition 13 in the spring of 1978. 
Much of the media coverage on this event dealt with the fact 
that direct voting on tax issues had resulted in a lowering 
of the tax burden. 
It was very natural to inquire, following such cover-
age, as to whether different political voting structures 
(i.e., indirect versus direct) would always produce differ-
ent election outcomes for taxing measures. 
Since taxes in today's society are levied most fre-
quently for the purpose of funding common, or public goods 
(as opposed to their being levied for strictly punitive pur-
poses), the question raised on whether different voting sys-
tems -vwuld produce different taxing levels was quickly 
followed by a second question on the amounts of public goods 
such tax levels would purchase. 




twofold: to determine whether the tax costs of public goods 
would differ under different political voting systems and 
secondly, to determine ·whether the quantity of tax-funded 
pulic goods -vmuld also differ between different voting sys-
tems which provided them. 
As a prelude to the research effort, this researcher 
surveyed related works by other authors. The following sec-
tion briefly summarizes previous research efforts in this 
field. 
Related Research Efforts 
Studies by political scientists on voting systems, as 
Chapter II of this research pointed out, tended to take a 
behavioristic approach to the analyzing of election out- · 
comes. Results of elections were viewed as the starting 
point from vJhich one could isolate socioeconomic character-
istics of the voters. The implication underlying such stud-
ies was that voter behavior could be explained and possibly 
predicted by reference to cultural traits of the voter. 
While the political scientists' mode of analysis pro-
ceeded backwards from election outcomes to the individual 
voters producing such outcomes, researchers utilizing indus-
trial and economic modes tended to move forward in time, 
linking election results· to the public goods produced as a 
result of such elections. 
Research under the industrial approach into the cost 
effectiveness of education concentrated on quantifying the 
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educational output produced by predetermined dollar level 
inputs of educational resources. The outputs were expressed 
in terms of pupil performance on standardized achievement 
tests. 
In an attempt to analyze the efficiency of providing 
public education, economists linked dollar measures of edu-
cational inputs and outputs under a benefit-cost framework. 
Educational outputs, or benefits, under this mode, were 
measured by the additional dollars of lifetime income at-
tributable to an individual's education. 
While researchers in political science, education and 
economics may have made mention of political voting struc-
tures, they did so only in passing and, generally, tended to 
regard the ballot box or the legislature only as starting 
points from which to begin research efforts. 
This research effort, in contrast, has concentrated on 
the political voting structure itself as being a possible 
determinant of the level of expenditures for the public good 
of elementary and secondary education. 
The Approach of This Study 
This research raised the question as to whether differ-
ences in the political voting structure under which deci~ 
sions on the provision of the public good of elementary and 
secondary education were made would affect the efficiency of 
providing such a good. 
Public elementary and secondary education was selected 
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for study because of the ease ;;vith which educational tax 
dollars could be traced to the educational systems. 
The methodological approach to this study began with 
the construction of two research questions which are para-
phrased below: 
1. Will the level of taxation for public goods chosen 
under a direct voting system differ from that set 
under an indirect voting system? 
2. Will the level of benefits received from tax-funded 
public goods under a direct voting system differ 
from that received under an indirect voting system? 
Hith the states of Indiana and Ohio serving respective-
ly as examples of the indirect and direct voting systems, 
the costs and benefits of public elementary and secondary 
education were represented by the effective tax rates on 
real property and the retention rates of school systems. 
The use of such real-world surrogates enabled the two 
research questions to be translated into statistically test-
able hypotheses, as follows: 
1. The effective local real property tax rate for pub-
lie elementary and secondary education does not 
differ between Indiana and Ohio. 
Or, H : R Indiana = R 0 c c Ohio 
2. The retention rate of public elementary and second-
ary education systems does not differ between Indi-
ana and Ohio. 
Or, H .. Rb = Rb o· Indiana Ohio 
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This study focused upon rates of cost and of benefit 
of education in order to avoid the problems inherent in im-
puting hypothetical lifetime income streams which were at-
tributable to education. As Chapter III pointed out, one 
can bypass this imputation and still derive an efficiency 
measure for education by focusing on the rate components of 
this study's.benefit-cost equation for education. Under 
this research's methods, if the retention rate for public 
elementary and secondary education exceeds the cost rate, 
the dollar benefits will also exceed dollar costs. 
Before this study made benefit-cost comparisons, 
though, it tested the retention rates and the effective tax 
rates separately for differences between the two political 
voting systems, using a one-way analysis of variance. 
The following section summarizes the results obtained 
from this te~ting procedure and details the conclusions 
reached by this researcher follmving an interpretation of 
those testing results. 
Conclusions of the Study 
The Empirical Test Results 
The empirical data for this study's testing were gath-
ered on a county-wide basis from Indiana and Ohio. The 
tests themselves were conducted separately for each of the 
four years in the study: 1964, 1967, 1971 and 1976. 
A one-way analysis of variance on retention rates for 
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public elementary and secondary education conducted in each 
of the four study years revealed no significant differences 
between the different political voting systems represented 
by Indiana and Ohio. Thus, the null hypothesis of H0 : 
Rb Indiana = ~ Ohio could not be rejected at alpha levels 
of .05 or less. 
Significant differences between the two states' effec-
tive real property tax rates for public elementary and sec-
ondary education were observed at the 0::.01 level in 1964, 
1967 and 1976 and at the <X .05 level in 1971. 
However, no di.scernable link c.ould be observed between 
the voting system and the level of effective tax rates: the 
direct voting system of Ohio had significantly lower tax 
rates in 1967 and in 1971 while the indirect voting state of 
Indiana had significantly lower tax rates in 1964 and 1976. 
Since significant differences were observed only in 
effective tax rates, the results obtained from construction 
of state-wide benefit-cost ratios utilizing county averages 
of the retention and tax rates paralleled those observed in 
testing the effective tax rates. The state having the lower 
tax rate in a particular test year would also have the larg-
er benefit-cost ratio; thus, in 1967 and 1971, Ohio was the 
more efficient in utilizing real property taxes for educa-
tion; in 1964 and 1976, Indiana was more efficient. 
In an attempt to determine whether the differences in 
effective tax rates within the years of the study could be 
traced to differences in the political voting system struc-
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tures, ~this research examined the changes which took place 
in the components of the school operating tax structure from 
1960-1976. 
The Changes in Total School Taxes 
In Chapter IV, it was noted that the difference which 
existed between the two states' effective tax rates were 
most likely attributable to differences between the gross 
amount of school operating taxes levied within the states. 
These differences, in turn, could be traced to the changes 
vlhich took place over time in the components of the gross 
taxes; the nominal tax rate and the assessed value of the 
real property subject to taxation. 
In the state of Ohio, for three of the four years under 
study, it was observed that the largest contributing factor 
to the change in total school operating taxes was the change 
in nominal tax rates. Since changes in nominal tax rates 
are the province of the voters in Ohio, it appears that much 
of the change in total taxes in Ohio could be attributed to 
voter action. 
For Indiana, the largest contributing factor to the 
change in total school operating taxes was, in three of the 
four years of the study, that of the change in assessed 
values of real property. Since changes in assessed values 
are the function of elected county assessors in Indiana, one 
may attribute the change in total school operating taxes in 
the indirect voting state of Indiana to action on the part 
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of such elected officials. 
Conclusions 
As Chapter IV points out, efficiency in the provision 
of the public good of elementary and secondary education 
does not appear, under this study's methodology, to be at-
tributable to any one particular voting structure. Of the 
four years encompassed by this study, the indirect voting 
state of Indiana -vms more efficient (i.e., had a greater 
benefit to cost ratio) than was the direct voting state of 
Ohio in two of those years; the state of Ohio was more effi-
cient in the other two years. 
The surrogate of retention rates, employed in this 
study to represent benefits of public elementary and second-
ary education, appeared to operate independently of politi-
cal voting systern structure and of the total amounts of 
taxes levied for such education, although such a conclusion 
is reached only by observance of the analysis of variance 
results of Chapter IV and does not represent the result of 
statistical testing. 
Hhile this study does point to significant differences 
in the effective tax rates of different political voting 
systems, no conclusion can be reached as to the direction of 
the difference. The indirect and the direct voting systems 
each had two years in which they levied lower effective tax 
rates; conversely, each also had two years of higher effec-
tive tax rates than the other system. 
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If one may glean any information from observing the 
changes in the components of total school operating taxes, 
however, it may be the following: within the direct voting 
system of Ohio, total school operating taxes were altered to 
a greater extent by voter selection of higher nominal tax 
rates than by county assessor changes in assessed valuation 
of taxable real property. Conversely, within the indirect 
voting system of Indiana, total school operating taxes were 
altered to a greater extent by county assessor changes in 
assessed valuation of taxable real property than by elected 
official selection of higher nominal tax rates. 
Implications for Future Research 
Hhile thi:3 study attempted to determine the effects, if 
any, of political voting system structure upon the costs and 
benefits of a particular public good, it did so on a small 
scale, confining itself to two states, each of which 'taxed 
real property as a means of funding public elementary and 
secondary education. 
A very natural extension of this research would involve 
conducting it on a national scale. Public elementary and 
secondary education, as Chapter I points outs, represents an 
area of ever-increasing costs and personnel commitments. 
The recent creation of a separate federal Department of Edu-
cation may indicate that the national government itself does 
not expect these extensive commitments of money and time to 
be diminished in the near future. 
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Extension of such a study to the national level would 
require the ability to effectively trace different types of 
tax dollars to their objects of expenditure because many 
states rely on indirect means of taxation, such as sales or 
excise taxes, to finance the public good of education. 
It may be that the greater need for future research in 
taxation lies in establishing such a tracing method: in de-
vising a system that can readily link tax dollars to the 
public goods they buy. This is, after all, no more than the 
translating of one governmental function into terms readily 
understandable to even the most novice consumer: one should 
get what one pays for. At the present time, the linkage be-
tween being taxed for public goods and being supplied with 
such goods is often a very tenuous one. 
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APPENDIX A 
SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES 
The following table illustrate:3 the extent to which 
school districts in Indiana and Ohio are locally financed. 
TABLE XVIII 
SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES BY SOURCE 
INDIANA AND OHIO IU 1.972 






















100% 59% .09% 
$1,506,885 $1 ,363,662 $ 522 
71% - -











6 . 7"/o 
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The reliance of school districts in Ohio and Indiana 
upon the property tax as a source of funding becomes even 
more apparent if Table XVIII is presented in terms of local 
revenues only, as is done in Table XIX. 
Indiana 
TABLE XIX 
SCHOOL DISTRICT REVENUES FROM LOCAL SOURCES: 
INDIANA AND OHIO IN 1972 









Revenues Revenues Charges 
From From I and 
Property Other Other 
Taxes ! Taxes I Sources 
Percent- li 
$ 839' 684! $ 737' 9431 $1~1441 $100' 597 
___ ag_e_s __ -r-----1~0% __ ~ ______ 88% .1% __ 1_1_._9_% ________ _ 




100% 90.5% .03% 9.5% 
The columns from Tables XVIII and XIX that are titled 
"Charges and Other Revenues" comprise revenues received by 
school districts from such activities as school lunch sales, 
interest earnings and sale of property: from activities 
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that occur only as a result of the school district itself 
being in operation. The property tax, then, may be viewed 
as not only the backbone of school district funding for 
these states, but as the impetus behind the generation of 
miscellaneous school district income. 
Information supplied by the Office of Education of the 
Department of Health, Education and Welfare on school fi-
nance programs further reiterates the dependency of Ohio 
and Indiana elementary and secondary public school systems 
upon the property tax (49, pp. 121, 171). 
1961-61: Local Support for Public Schools 
Indiana 
Local and county revenue for public elemen-
tary and secondary schools is, for all practical 
purposes, derived from property taxes. 
Approximately !+% of the local and cou.11ty 
revenue received for schools is from local poll 
tax levies. 
There is no other nonproperty tax author-
ized for the schools. 
Ohio 
Approximately 91% of the locally derived 
school revenues is from property taxes. The oth-
er 9% includes receipts from interest on bank de-
posits, school lunches and other miscellaneous 
items. 
There are no authorized nonproperty taxes for 
school support. 
1966-67: Local Support for Public Schools . 
Indiana 
Same as 1961-62. 
Ohio 
Same as 1961-62. 
1968-69: Local Support for Public Schools -· 
Indiana 
Same as 1961-62 
Ohio 
Same as 1961-62 
1971-72: Local Support for Public Schools .. 
Indiana 
Local and county revenues for public elemen-
tary and secondary schools are derived primarily 
from property taxes and an excise tax on motor 
vehicles. 
Ohio 
Same as 1961-62. 
1975-76: Local Supf?ort for Public Schools 
Indiana 
Local and county revenues for public elemen-
tary and secondary schools are derived primarily 
from an ad valorem property tax, a motor vehicle 
excise tax and a local option income tax -v;rhich is 
available in counties adopting the local option 
tax. 
Ohio 
Same as 1961-62. 
As noted in the preceding paragraphs, Indiana took 
115 
steps to shift educational financing away from sole depend-
ency on the property tax, with the funneling of motor vehi-
cle excise taxes to the schools in 1971 and the institution 
of an optional local income tax in 1974. Indiana counties 
that do not adopt an income tax are restricted to the tax 
rates for property that were in effect in 1973. This limits 
future property tax increases to increases in assessed value 
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only (2, pp. 27-28). 
Until the local income tax makes some headway in Indi-
ana, the state, like its neighbor Ohio, will find itself in 
the position of funding its public elementary and secondary 
schools through property taxes. 
APPENDIX B 
STATE DEHOGRAPHIC VARIABLES 
This appendix outlines the procedures undertaken to 
determine 1vhether there were other demographic differences 
between the states of Indiana and Ohio beyond those of vo-
system construction that might possibly have been the cause 
of different levels of efficiency in the provision of educa-
tion. In order to focus solely on the voting system differ-
ences, it was necessary to determine whether Indiana and 
Ohio had the same financial ability available for purchasing 
public goods and whether they had the same need for purchas-
ing such goods. 
The follo,.;ring five demographic variables were selected 
for testing and data obtained on them for Indiana and Ohio 
for a time period corresponding to the years in the study. 
(35). 
Per capita personal income 
School-age population as a percentage of total popula-
tion 
Public school enrollment as a percentage of total 
school enrollment 
Percentage of total public school revenue supplied by 
local governments 
Property tax revenues of state and local governments as 
a percentage of total tax revenues 
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It should be noted that because time-series data con-
sist of observations of a variable at different points in 
time, there is usually a mutual dependence of successive ob-
servations. 
Thus, an observed value of a variable may be correla-
ted with, and hence, not be independent of the value of the 
same variable in the previous time period (or, xt+l = 
[Cxt)). This type of correlation is termed autocorrelation 
and describes the correlation of a time series with itself. 
One of the basic stipulations of statistical testing 
·is that the data being tested must represent random samples 
from the population. The existence of autocorrelation with-
in a time series means that d.:tta observations are not ran-
dom, or independent, of one another; hence, the traditional 
tests of significance are not acceptable (33, p. 352). 
However, it has been found that many economic time 
series which contain autocorrelation when the raw data are 
used in tests of significance exhibit no autocorrelation in 
tests in which first differences of the data are used. (9, 
p. 125), (33, p. 364), (36, p. 439), (32, pp. 28, 56, 64-
67). 
Thus, statistical tests of differences may be run on 
first differences of time series data "~:vi thout violating the 
assumption of random observations. 
Data for the five previously mentioned demographics 
were obtained for each state (Indiana and Ohio) and tested 
for the presence of autocorrelation using the coefficient of 
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autocorrelation (17, p. 337), as is shown below: 
Where: r = coefficient of autocorrelation 
z = residual error 
t time period 
Tests for autocorrelation on the data for the five 
demographics revealed autocorrelation significant at the 1% 
level for school-age population, public school enrollment 
and public school revenue. Per capita income demographics 
contained autocorrelation ;;.;hen tested at the 5% level of 
significance but not at the 1% level. Property tax revenue 
demographics contain2d no autocorrelation at either the 5% 
or 1% level. The results of the testing procedures are pre-
sented in the tables following the text of the appendix. 
After first differencing, testing for the presence of 
autocorrelation on the first differences revealed no signif-
icant autocorrelation (.01 level) in any of the four demo-
graphic series which had been autocorrelated. 
A Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed ranks test was then 
run of the first differences of four demographic series 
(school-age population, public school enrollment, public 
school revenue and per capita income) and on the actual data 
of property tax revenue. The Wilcoxon test is the nonpara-
metric equivalent of the parametric paired t test; its 
power is approximately 95% relative to the paired t test 
when both are applied to normally distributed differences 
(42, p. 87). 
A nonparametric test was chosen for testing differ-
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ences in the states' demographics in this instance because 
of the small number of observations obtainable for each 
demographic variable; this researcher did not feel that the 
parametric test assumptions of normally distributed popula-
tions and equal population variances could be satisfactorily 
met with such a small number of observations. Since non-
·parametric statistics are distribution-free statistics in 
that they do not depend upon a prior knowledge of population 
distribution and parameters, they may be used to test for 
significance in instances where it is not possible to speci-
fy the functional form of the population distribution. 
The results of the Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (a two-
tailed test where H : No difference between distribution of 
0 
demographic variables between states and where an alpha lev-
el of .01 was employed) resulted in an inability to reject 
H for each of the five demographic variables tested. 
0 
Additional Information 
Both Indiana and Ohio experienced a positive rate of 
population change from 1950-75 with Indiana's population inO 
creasing 3.2% over this period and Ohio's increasing 3.1% 
(50). 
Both states reported equivalent median years of 
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schooling achieved for persons 25 years and older: 9.9 
years, 10.0 years and 12.1 years for Ohio in 1950, 1960 and 
1970; 9.6 years, 10.8 years and 12.1 years for Indiana in 
1950, 1960 and 1970, respectively (45). 
Since the voter behavior studies concerned themselves 
with identifying many socioeconomic characteristics which 
may have influenced voter behavior, this researcher also ex-
amined several such characteristics within Indiana and Ohio, 
specifically the following: percentage of population that 
is black, percentage of population aged 65 years or older, 
percentage of population that is urban, birth rate of popu-
lation and density of population. 
\men the preceding characteristics were subjected to 
the testing procedures previously described, the null hy-
pothesis of no differences could not be rejected at an alpha 
level of .01. It should be pointed out that the linkage of 
such characteristics to voter behavior is dependent, in many 
cases, upon the specific regression model constructed; the 
significance of the demographic, in other words, may depend 
upon who is conducting the research. Denzau, for example, 
found that the variables of race and parent's education were 
irrelevent in determining a populace's educational spending 
(16, p. 246). 
Results of the Statistical Tests 
The tables which begin on the following page detail 
the results of the statistical tests on the five demographic 
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variables mentioned on page 114 of this appendix. 
The reader is referred to the following sources for 
presentation of the statistical significance tables utilized 
by this researcher: (17, p. 338; 11, p. 383). 
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TABLE XX 
PER CAPITA PERSONAL INCO~~: 
ACTUAL DATA 
t (Year) Ohio Indiana 
1 (1960) 2,339 2,179 
2 (1961) 2,330 2,213 
3 (1962) 2,392 2,350 
4 (1963) 2,474 2,481 
5 (1965) 2,829 2,846 
6 (1966) 3,056 3,076 
7 (1968) 3,509 3,412 
8 (1969) 3, 738 3' 687 
9 (1970) 3,972 3,781 
10 (1971) 4,175 4,027 
11 (1972) 4,534 4,366 
12 (1974) 5,518 5,184 
___ " ________ 
















rtable 0<-. 01 
TABLE XXI 
TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
ACTUAL DATA ON PER 
CAPITA INCOME 
Ohio Indiana 
xt xt+l xt 
2,339 2,330 2,179 
2,330 2,392 2,213 
2,392 2,474 2,350 
2,474 2,829 2,481 
2,829 3,056 2,846 
3,056 3,509 3,076 
3,509 3,738 3,412 
3,738 3,972 3,687 
3,972 4,175 3,781 
4,175 4,534 LJ-,027 
4,534 5,518 4,366 
5,518 2,339 5,184 
= . 4854.9994 Calculated r 
= .348 r table e<. 05 















= ./..j.7 876 742 
= .348 
= .505 
Significant autocorrelation Significant autocorrelation 
exists at 0(. 05 and at exists at the oc . OS level 
0<".01 levels. but not at the ex. 01 level. 
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TABLE XXII 
COMPUTATION OF FIRST DIFFERENCES: 






t xt xt+1 (xt- xt+1) xt xt+1 (xt- xt+1) 
1 2,339 2,330 9 2,179 2,213 - 34 
2 2,330 2,392 - 62 2,213 2,350 -137 
3 2,392 2,474 - 82 2,350 2,481 -131 
4 2,474 2,829 -355 2,481 2,846 -365 
5 2,829 3,056 -227 2,846 3,076 -230 
6 3,056 3,509 -453 3,076 3' 4-12 -336 
7 3,509 3, 738 -229 3,412 3,687 -275 
8 3,738 3,972 -234 3,687 3,781 - 94 
9 3,972 4,175 -203 3,781 4,027 -246 
10 4,175 4,534 -359 4,027 4,366 -339 
11 4,534 5,518 -984 L~, 36 6 5,184 -818 














TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 




9 - 62 - 34 
- 62 - 82 -137 
- 82 -355 -131 
-355 -227 -365 
-227 -453 -230 
-453 -229 -336 
-229 -234 -275 
-234 -203 - 94 
-203 -359 -21+6 
-359 -984 -339 













Calculated r = -.11048923 
-- -.539 
Calculated r = -.13367178 
r table Of. OS 
r table ocOl = -.679 
No significant auto-
correlation exists at 
the o<. 05 or at the 
rx. 01 level. 
r = -.539 table c<.OS 
r = -. 6 79 table oc 01 
No significant auto-
correlation exists at 






2 - 62 










WILCOXON SIGNED RANKS TEST 
USING FIRST DIFFERENCES ON 
PER CAPITA INCOME 
Dt D. l 
Indiana (Ohio - Indiana) 







- 94 -140 
-246 43 
















T (test statistic) Rankings 9+10+3+11 
= 33 
at cx.os, n = 11 at cx.Ol, n = 11 
upper quantile = 55 upper quantile = 60 
lower quantile = 11 lm,.rer quantile = 6 
Since T does not fall outside the upper or lower quantile 
limits at CX.OS or cx.Ol, the null hypothesis H : no 


















SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL POPULATION: ACTUAL DATA 
(Year) Ohio Indiana 
(1960) 25.2% 26.1% 
(1962) 25.3% 26.1% 
(1963) 26.1% 26.3% 
(1964) 26.4% 26 . 9/o 
(1966) 26.8% 26.9% 
(1967) 26.8% 26.9% 
(1969) 26 . 8/o 26.8% 
(1970) 2 7. 2/o 26. r~ 
(1971) 26.3% 26.5% 
(1972) 25.8% 25.8% 
(1973) 25.1% 25.3% 


















rtable IX. 01 
TABLE XXVI 
TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
ACTUAL DATA ON SCHOOL-
AGE POPULATION 
Ohio Indiana 
xt xt+1 xt 
25.2 25.3 26.1 
25.3 26.1 26.1 
26.1 26.4 26.3 
26.4 26.8 26.9 
26.8 26.8 26.9 
26.8 26.8 26.9 
26.8 27.2 26.8 
27.2 26.3 26.7 
26.3 25,8 26.5 
25.8 25.1 25.8 
25.1 2LJ. .1 25.3 
24.1 25.2 24.3 
= .7383042 Calculated r 
= .348 r table c<.05 


















Significant autocorrelation Significant autocorrelation 
exists at C< • 05 and at exists at (X. 05 and at 
<X. 01 levels 0(, 01 levels. 
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TABLE XXVII 







t xt xt+1 (x -t xt+1) xt xt+1 (x -t xt+1) 
1 25.2 25.3 -0.1 26.1 26.1 0.0 
2 25.3 26.1 -0.8 26.1 26.3 -0.2 
3 26.1 26.4 -0.3 26.3 26.9 -0.6 
4 26 .I+ 26.8 -0.4 26.9 26.9 0.0 
5 26.8 26.8 0.0 26.9 26.9 0.0 
6 26.8 26.8 0.0 26.9 26.8 0.1 
7 26.8 27.2 -0.4 26.8 26.7 0.1 
8 27.2 26.3 0.9 26.7 26.5 0.2 
9 26.3 25.8 0.5 26.5 25.8 0.7 
10 25.8 25.1 0.7 25.8 25.3 0.5 
11 25.1 24.1 1.0 25.3 24.3 1.0 














r table C<, 05 
rtable C<'. 01 
TABLE XXVIII 
TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
FIRST DIFFERENCES OF SCHOOL-
AGE POPULATION 
Ohio Indiana 




-0.8 -0.3 -0.2 
-0.3 -0.4 I -0.6 
-0. L~ 0.0 0.0 
0.0 0.0 0.0 
0.0 -0. !,. 0.1 
-0.4 0.9 0.1 
0.9 0.5 0.2 
0.5 0.7 0.7 
0.7 1.0 0.5 
1.0 -0.1 1.0 
== .39142857 Calculated 
= .353 r table D<. 05 














r = .44370229 
= .353 
= . 515 
Significant autocorrelation Significant autocorrelation 
exists at the rx. 05 level exists at the (.)(.05 level 















WILCOXON SIGNED RANKS TEST 
USING FIRST DIFFERENCES ON 
SCHOOL-AGE POPULATION 
Dt D. 1. 
























T (test statistic) = Rankings 5+9+3.5 
= 17.5 
ato<".05, n -- 9 at 0(. 01, n = 9 
upper quantile = 39 upper quantile 43 
lower quantile = 6 lower quantile = 2 
Since T does not fall outside the upper or lm.ver quantile 
limits at <X.05 or 0<'.01, the null hypothesis H : no 
















PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLLMENT AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL SCHOOL ENROLlJ'-iENT: ACTUAL DATA 
(Year) Ohio Indiana 
(1959) 85.2% 88.7% 
(196 2) 83.9% 87.9% 
(1964) 83.6% 88. 1 fo 
(1966) 84. 2/o 88. 6/a 
(1968) 86.8% 89.9% 
(1969) 87. 5/o 90. 6/~ 
(1970) 8 7. 0/~ 90.9% 
(1971) 87.0% 90. 9~~ 
(1972) 88. 4/o 9 2. 0/o 




TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
ACTUAL DATA ON PUBLIC 
SCHOOL ENROLU1ENT 
Ohio 
t xt xt+l 
1 85.2 83.9 
2 83.9 83.6 
3 83.6 84.2 
4 84.2 86.8 
5 86.8 87.5 
6 87.5 87.0 
7 87.0 87.0 
8 87.0 88.4 
9 88.4- 88.9 
10 88.9 85.2 
Calculated r = .60689549 
rtable 01.05 = .360 
r table 0(.01 :::: . 525 
Significant autocorrelation 
exists at ex. 05 and at 













r table 0\, OS 









COMPUTATION OF FIRST DIFFERENCES: 






t xt xt+1 (xt- xt+1) xt xt+1 (x -t xt+1) 
1 85.2 83.9 1.3 88.7 87.9 0.8 
2 83.9 83.6 0.3 87.9 88.1 -0.2 
3 83.6 84.2 -0.6 88.1 88.6 -0.5 
4 84.2 86.8 -2.6 88.6 89.9 -1.3 
5 86.8 87.5 -0.7 89.9 90.6 -0.7 
6 87.5 87.0 0.5 90.6 90.9 -0.3 
7 87.0 87.0 0.0 90.9 90.9 0.0 
8 87.0 88 .1+ -1.4 90.9 92.0 -1.1 
9 88. l-1- 88.9 -0.5 92.0 92.4 -0.4 












TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 










































Calculated r = .17125645 Calculated r = .10131195 





correlation exists at 
the ~.05 or at the 
ex. 01 level. 
r table o(.os = .366 
r table CX'. 01 = . 533 
No significant auto-
correlation exists at 
the ~.05 or at the 













HILCOXON SIGNED RANKS TEST 
USING FIRST DIFFERENCES ON 
PUBLIC SCHOOL ENROLU1ENT 
Dt D. l 




















T (test statistic) Rankings 4. 5+4. 5+6 
= 15 
at oc.05, n = 7 at ex. 01, n = 7 
upper quantile = 25 upper quantile = 28 
lower quantile = 3 lower quantile = 0 
Since T does not fall outside the upper or lower quantile 
limits at ~.05 or ~.01, the null hypothesis H : no 




















PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE 
SUPPLIED BY LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: 
ACTUAL DATA 
(Year) Ohio Indiana 
(1960) 68.1% 65. 3~~ 
(1961) 68.5% 65.7% 
(1962) 7 !.t. 9% 65.7% 
(1963) 73. 9/o 63.3% 
(1964) 70.9% 62.6% 
(1966) 67.6% 55.3% 
(1967) 63.3% 52.5% 
(1969) 63.7% 61.0% 
(1970) 66.5% 63.6/o 
(1971) 63.3% 63.1% 
(1972) 60.9% 63.5% 
(1973) 58.5% 62.2% 
(1974) 56.5% 59.6% 



















r table CX'. 05 
r table IX'.Ol 
TABLE XXXVI 
TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
ACTUAL DATA ON PUBLIC 
SCHOOL REVENUE 
Ohio Indiana 
xt xt+l xt 
68.1 68.5 65.3 
68.5 74-.9 65.7 
74.9 73.9 65.7 
73.9 70.9 63.3 
70.9 67.6 62.6 
67.6 63.3 55.3 
63.3 63.7 52.5 
63.7 66.5 61.0 
66.5 63.3 63.6 
63.3 60.9 63.1 
60.9 58.5 63.5 
58.5 56.5 62.2 
56.5 57.5 59.6 
57.5 68.1 58.8 
.73940378 Calculated r 
= .335 r table 0('.05 




















Significant autocorrelation Significant autocorrelation 
exists at or. OS and at exists at 0<'. OS and at 
lX. 01 levels. cx.Ol levels. 
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TABLE XXXVII 
COMPUTATION OF FIRST DIFFERENCES: 






t xt xt+1 (x -t xt+1) xt xt+1 (xt- xt+1) 
1 68.1 68.5 -0.4 65.3 65.7 -0.4 
2 65.5 74.9 -6.4 65.7 65.7 0.0 
3 74.9 73.9 1.0 65.7 63.3 2.4 
4 73.9 70.9 3.0 63.3 62.6 0.7 
5 70.9 67.6 3.3 62.6 55.3 7.3 
6 67.6 63.3 4.3 55.3 52.5 2.8 
7 63.3 63.7 -0.4 52.5 61.0 -8.5 
8 63.7 66.5 -2.8 61.0 63.5 -2.6 
9 66 . .5 63.3 3.2 63.6 63.1 0.5 
10 63.3 60.9 2.4 63.1 63.5 -0.4 
11 60.9 58.5 2.4 63.5 62.2 1.3 
12 58.5 56.5 2.0 62.2 59.6 2.6 
13 56.5 57.5 -1.0 59.6 58.8 0.8 
















TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 

























































Calculated r = .20340976 Calculated r = .16623036 
rtable rx.05 = .341 
rtable 0(.01 = . 4-95 
No significant auto-
correlation exists at 
the oc . 05 or at the 
ex. 01 leve 1. 
r table o<. 05 




correlation exists at 


















WILCOXON SIGNED RANKS TEST 
USING FIRST DIFFERENCES ON 
PUBLIC SCHOOL REVENUE 
Dt D. l 




























T (test statistic) = Rankings 11+4+10+1+2+6 
34 
at oc. 05, n = 12 at 0( .01' n ·- 12 
upper quantile == 64 upper quantile 70 
lmver quantile = 14 lower quantile :::: 8 
Since T does not fall outside the upper or lm.;rer quantile 
limits at cx:.o5 or ex .01, the null hypothesis H : no 
















PROPERTY TAX REVENUE OF STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL 
TAX REVENUES : ACTUAL DATA 
(Year) Ohio Indiana 
(1962) 52.1% 56.1% 
(1963) 51.9% 56.6% 
(1964) 51. 8/o 49.1% 
(1965) 51. 8/o 49.0% 
( 196 7) 49.1% 47. 9/~ 
(1968) 47.9% L~9. 4% 
(1969) 47.2% 47.0% 
(1970) 47.2% 50.8% 
(1971) 43. 0/o 59.5% 





TESTS FOR AUTOCORRELATION USING 
ACTUAL DATA ON PROPERTY 
TAX REVENUES 
Ohio 
t xt xt+l 
1 52.1 51.9 
2 51.9 51.8 
3 51.8 51.8 
4 51.8 49.1 
5 49.1 47.9 
6 47.9 47.2 
7 47.2 47.2 
8 47.2 43.0 
9 43.0 38.6 
10 38.6 52.1 
Calculated r = .35345510 
rtable Oc'.05 = .360 
r table cx.Ol = . 525 
No significant auto-
correlation exists at the 













Calculated r = -.00888504 
r table o<. 05 




correlation exists at the 















WILCOXON SIGNED RANKS TEST 
USING ACTUAL DATA ON 
PROPERTY TAX REVENUES 
Dt D. ]._ 
























T (test statistic) = Rankings 4+5+2+1 
= 12 
at <X.OS, n = 10 at c<. 01' n = 10 
upper quantile == 46 upper quantile 51 
lower quantile = 9 lower quantile = 4 
Since T does not fall outside the upper or lower quantile 
limits at cx.05 or <X.Ol, the null hypothesis H: no 
difference between xt Oh' and xt I d' is ac8epted. 1.0 n 1.ana 
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DATA FOR INDIANA 
TABLE XLIII 
DATA FOR RETENTION RATE 



























































TABLE XLIII (Continued) 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1965 Fall 1966 
Gibson 5,570 5,467 
Grant 16,596 16,055 
Greene 5,377 5,221 
Hamilton 10,774 10,829 
Hancock 6,816 6,778 
Harrison 4,223 4,183 
Hendricks 10,676 10,649 
Henry 10,567 10,315 
Howard 17,358 17,260 
Huntington 6,730 6,581 
Jackson 6,390 6,379 
Jasper 3' 646 3,600 
Jay !+,881 L~c, 786 
Jefferson 4,923 4, 8L~s 
J.ennings 3,721 3,621 
Johnson 12,518 12,423 
Knox 6,967 6,830 
Kosciusko 10,523 10,514 
Lafrange 4,851 4' 6!.~ 7 
Lake 109,304 108,328 
Laporte 20,671 20,544 
Lawrence 7,717 7,591 
Madison 27,091 26,798 
Marion 141,989 137,869 
Marshall 7,755 7,774 
Hartin 2,LJ.19 2,176 
Hi ami 9,971 9,753 
Monroe 12 '09 7 12,066 
Hontgomery 7,003 6,848 
Morgan 9,551 9,440 
Newton 2,617 2,518 
Noble 6,141 5,989 
Ohio 859 82L+ 
Orange 3,485 3,402 
Owen 2,200 2,164 
Parke 2,912 2,836 
Perry 4,422 4,304 
Pike 2,390 2,344 
Porter 16,138 16,310 
Posey 3,796 3,871 
Pulaski 2,459 2,455 
Putnam 5,293 5,257 
Randolph 6,497 6,322 
Ripley 4,864 4,685 












































































TABLE XLIII (Continued) 
FOR YEAR 1967 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1968 Fall 1969 
Adams 5,074 5,123 
Allen 47,448 47,207 
Bartholomew 12,330 12,216 
Benton 2,838 2,802 
Blackford 3,374 3,284 
Boone 6,472 6, 441 
Brown 2,181 2,071 
Carroll 3,313 3,292 
Cass 7,705 7,634 
Clark 15,260 15,114 
Clay 4,471 4,418 
Clinton 6,833 6,752 
Crawford 1,702 1,715 
Daviess 4,826 4,866 
Dearborn 6,451 6,356 
Decatur 4,571 4,544 
Dekalb 6,557 6,553 
Delaware 25 '542 24,978 
Dubois 6,562 6,572 
Elkhart 26,081 25 '6 87 
Fayette 5,377 5,316 
Floyd 10,939 10,952 
Fountain 4,059 3,918 
Franklin 2,950 2,789 
Fulton 3,193 3,095 
Gibson 5,681 5,691 
Grant 17,799 17,253 
Greene 5, 485 5 '485 
Hamilton 12,212 12,387 
Hancock 7,544 7,576 
Harrison 4,379 4,422 
Hendricks 11,944 12,017 
Henry 10,891 10,648 
Howard 18,777 18,152 
Huntington 6,894 6,865 
Jackson 6,728 6,660 
Jasper 3,6L~7 3,678 
Jay 5,201 4,931 
Jefferson 5,259 5,133 
Jennings 3,975 3,815 
Johnson 13,899 13,732 
Knox 7,010 7,069 
Kosciusko 11,107 11,025 
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TABLE XLIII (Continued) 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1968 Fall 1969 
Lagrange 4, 889 4, 756 
Lake 116, 20L!- 113,753 
Laporte 21,585 21,348 
Lawrence 7,895 7,688 
Madison 28,323 27,496 
Marion 153,203 147,757 
Marshall 7,032 7,109 
Martin 2,508 2' 549 
Miami 10,651 10,131 
Monroe 12,979 12,646 
Montgomery 7,307 7,193 
Morgan 10,418 10,226 
Newton 2,658 2,598 
Noble 6,484 6,280 
Ohio 913 890 
Orange 3 '514 3,472 
Owen 2,281 2,249 
Parke 3,000 2,999 
Perry 4,461 4,Lj-81 
Pike 2, 515 2,419 
Porter 18,474 18,540 
Posey 4,198 4,248 
Pulaski 2,562 2,548 
Putnam 5,586 5 '49/+ 
Randolph 6,713 6,422 
Ripley 4' 551 4,479 
Rush 4,188 4,071 
St. Joseph 44,808 43 '918 
Scott 4,058 3,993 
Shelby 8,271 8,092 
Spencer 3,800 3,720 
Starke 4,242 4,169 
Steuben 3,241 3,225 
Sullivan 3,932 3,862 
Switzerland 1,344 1,312 
Tippecanoe 17,508 17,082 
Tipton 3,601 3 '642 
Union 1' 610 1,556 
Vanderburgh 28,553 28,154 
Vermillion 3,151 3,053 
Vi go 19,455 19,001 
Wabash 7,476 7,344 
Harren 1, 715 1,748 
Harrick 5,692 5,887 























































































































12 '82 7 
10 '640 
20,061 































































































































Data in Table XLIII was compiled from information 
furnished by the Indiana Department of Public Instruction, 
Division of Research and Data Processing in their Report 
A: Number of Pupils "?nrolled in Indiana Public School 
Corporation, (Indianapolis, annually). 
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TABLE XLIV 
DATA FOR EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 
CALCULATIONS IN INDIANA 
FOR YEAR 1964 
Assessed Assessed School Taxes 
Value, Value, Levied on 
Real All All 
Count'ies Property Property Property 
Adams $ 36,024,510 $ 54,594,540 $ 1,205,606.06 
Allen 359' 439' 34.0 549,400,050 13' 623' 871.40 
Bartholo-
mew 67' 6l}4' 150 114,343,910 2,872,771.10 
Benton 30,283,100 42,817,260 1, 0 39, 341. 82 
Blackford 18,754,860 29,853,185 748,016.76 
Boone 44,329,320 64,830,490 1,980,619.73 
Brown 6,968,400 10,165,320 325,593.53 
Carroll 31,707,910 45,512,900 1,125,862.35 
Cass 54,143,840 89,078,960 2,178,783.05 
Clark 72,102,835 110,781,740 2,320,497.22 
Clay 22,322,685 36 ,·281, 6l}O 928,545.64 
Clinton 49,897,555 70' 4ll}' 025 1,822,165.85 
Crawford 6,152, 710 10,129,080 152,467.67 
Daviess 24,305,500 37,268,010 990,048.76 
Dearborn 38,826,465 92,128,875 1,416,581.24 
Decatur 25,000,605 38,490,075 1,038,587.23 
Dekalb 30,364,720 53,283,910 1,372,818.90 
Delaware 129,638,740 207,972,120 5,586,486.59 
Dubois 35,029,370 51,4.78,230 911,440.65 
Elkhart 174,916,700 261,424,890 6,833,515.46 
Fayette 30,211,370 45,718,890 1,172,819.39 
Floyd 59,784,090 96,461,175 1,957,322.22 
Fountain 24,328,030 37,371,760 793,228.84 
Franklin 18,241,800 26,846,820 587,706.94 
Fulton 25,888,960 40,731,000 997,306.92 
Gibson 37,094,575 55,934,645 1,255,367.06 
Grant 99,512,780 156,306,110 4,042,819.98 
Greene 21,882,220 37,681,785 918,419.59 
Hamilton 66,871,690 96,552,010 2,546,838.66 
Hancock 47,039,004 65,318,884 1,608,875.20 
Harrison 16,268,370 24,703,760 505,521.33 
Hendricks 54,567,890 80,987,980 2,029,745.50 
Henry 64,501,770 94,291,290 2,466,376.76 
Howard 97,616,550 158,723,570 4,735,663.69 
Huntington 41,943,550 66,436,160 1,897,605.24 
Jackson 36,007,690 56,618,110 1,286,731.17 













































TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties Pro:eerty Propert:J.: Pro:eerty Ratios 
Jay $ 27,192,96.5 $ 1+4' 184' 135 $ 1,004,276.82 . 26!!-100 
Jefferson 36,801,870 82,880,880 1,321,623.19 .282000 
Jennings 13,881,095 22,444,775 479' 211.75 .295725 
Johnson 56,891,370 83,288,260 2,160,759.84 .246900 
Knox 43,278,430 70,295,730 1,218,150.57 .254425 
Kosciusko 70,874,460 112,170,300 2,480,211.15 .238325 
Lagrange 27,495,700 40' 9lJ.0' 160 1,201,284.26 .267250 
Lake 568,405,360 1,111' 597' 225 35,963,086.21 .194000 
Laporte 131,781,910 219,125,260 6,16lJ.,272. 74. .252500 
Lawrence 31,489,185 55,630,190 1,252,236.05 .250525 
Madison 149,056,195 224,869,040 6,119,176.12 .255675 
Harion 1,087,909,000 1,599 '895' 260 44,603,007.65 .308200 
Marshall 52,295,460 81,078,920 2,107,128.18 .257200 
Martin 6,467,820 12,848,000 235,179.37 .222800 
Hi ami 39,752,725 54, 0L+4, 520 1,571,350.50 . 268025 
Monroe 64,404,925 9LJ.,575 ,550 2.,789,999.22 .254100 
Hontgomery 55,903,140 79,283,550 1,828,249.85 .291100 
Horgan 39,638,610 66,339,910 1,605,168.66 .235625 
Newton 25,905,080 37,268,350 950,647.25 .227075 
Noble 35,850,950 59,415,890 1,758,820.67 . 261500 
Ohio 4,002,410 5,711,090 145 '041. 85 .283100 
Orange 16,590,420 26,281,170 493,102.84 .293100 
Owen 8, 724,260 15,115,130 345,914.52 .215975 
Parke 17,768,300 29,172,140 845,739.25 .255125 
Perry 16,480,440 24,676,810 361,131.47 .290425 
Pike 12,254,920 21,709,440 368,902.51 . 258025 
Porter 79,811,790 11+0, 87LI-, 8L1-0 4,618,713.71 .209525 
Posey 27,793,600 41,736,120 1,054,556.65 .266675 
Pulaski 24,472,330 39,084,970 921,562.67 .265450 
Putnam 28,702,390 Ll-9 I 166' 380 1,183,005.37 .250900 
Randolph 44,689,600 65,669,405 1,4.26,465.67 .311025 
Ripley 20,002,710 34,507,020 1,052,845.80 .231600 
Rush 36,165,315 50,822,735 1,323,838.05 .287375 
St. Joseph 291,816,450 447,056,180 13,085, 3Lt9. 83 .257000 
Scott 15,065,280 22,891,910 464, 03LJ.. 58 .268025 
Shelby 47,250,930 69,255,475 1,680,394.42 .262225 
Spencer 17,140,550 26,868,100 523,468.94 .279075 
Starke 23,828,910 37,435,305 891,793.09 .271400 
Steuben 27,487,880 4-2, 9LJ.5, 730 1,209,442.45 .244850 
Sullivan 23,17l,Lt90 50,698,920 1,188,507.84. .220200 
Switzerland 6,872,450 9,884,!+20 284,260.83 .287125 
Tippecanoe 130,672,625 196,268,645 L1-, 732,990.77 .261300 
Tipton 26,145,670 37,940,190 1,100,898.98 .245250 
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TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties Property Proper tv Property Ratios 
Union $ 9,927,290 $ 15,080,980 $ 435 '893. 72 .284950 
Vander-
burgh 192,817,290 289,573,200 6,916,015.11 .277550 
Vermillion 15,021,865 24,936,035 671,662.14 .254625 
Vi go 106,845,910 205,287,410 6,474,074.22 .261450 
Wabash 39,893,400 62,158,950 2,214,391.55 .254750 
Warren 19,66Lt.,455 27,993,615 723,705.89 .255725 
Warrick 28,778,360 49,703,855 1' 04.8' 211.84 .251475 
Washington 19,633,680 29,176,640 547,995.02 .291450 
Wayne 100,009,720 151,085,880 3' 6 32' 17 7. 0 3 .288750 
Wells 32,778,150 49,738,560 1,258,420.41 .258825 
White 43,269,930 62,221,730 1,618,973.73 .256725 
Whitley 26,949,990 43,323,71,0 1,162,411.25 .245100 
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TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
FOR YEAR 1967 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties Property Property Property Ratios 
----~--
Adams $ 40,792,930 $ 61,578,430 $ 2,205,182.12 .210400 
Allen 446' 547' 540 665,767,310 22,953,213,20 .278200 
Bartholo-
mevJ 84,493,360 140,423,730 5,447,853,75 .263800 
Benton 31,669,075 44,733,465 1,322,474.53 .268200 
Blackford 20,002,195 30,497,040 872,362.75 .269500 
Boone 48,137,230 68,490,190 2,803,652.92 .238500 
Brm·m 7,895, 700 11,755,130 644,189.62 .148500 
Carroll 35,029,780 49,884,380 1,779,503.63 .233000 
Cass 57,383,810 91,569,955 3,112' 231.35 . 24-4200 
Clark 75,551,485 118,348,780 3,685,397.85 .234200 
Clay 24,302,400 40,221,155 1,407,999.30 . 239 300 
Clinton 53,515,220 76,316,455 2,826,923.46 .248000 
Cravlford 6,542,370 10,883,300 396,712.33 . 24-4400 
Daviess 28,054,200 41,921,835 1,792,212.94 .191700 
Dearborn 41,439,985 96,196,860 1,658,563.54 .244300 
Decatur 29,550,755 45,321,055 1,287,226.58 .234300 
Dekalb 35,926,590 58,626,900 2,508,024.04 .234500 
Delm·Jare 145,631,460 229,624,056 8,739,063.52 .232300 
Dubois 43,678,230 64,360,095 1,617,858.23 .249700 
Elkhart 184,866,410 290,182,530 11,592,793.65 .247500 
Fayette 38,877,030 60,473,500 1,861,829.82 .248200 
Floyd 65,505,285 101,850,150 3,056,605.01 .267300 
Fountain 25,695,350 53,598,405 1,379,739.45 .211300 
Franklin 20,240,335 38,987,770 955,546. L~9 .229800 
Fulton 28,2LJ-6,070 43' 98!+' 780 1,506,266.12 .244700 
Gibson 38,108,430 57,646,030 2,024,590.29 .256000 
Grant 114,559,190 179,336,440 7,207,556.94 .249800 
Greene 24,540,025 43,103,870 1,566,366.31 .225000 
Hamilton 77,255,370 108,264,040 4,412,734.14 .232600 
Hancock 52,069,032 71,174,012 2,357,888.15 .248000 
Harrison 18' 4-93' 715 27,681,175 939,091.88 .211400 
Hendricks 62,422,630 89,030,830 3,188,992.37 .217900 
Henry 72,492,380 106,146,930 3,728,839.36 .270700 
Ho·ward 117,123,900 197,099,720 7,335,892.69 .226300 
Huntington 49,051,150 74,449,590 2,672,248.31 .240200 
Jackson 41,482,160 64,384,800 2,118,847.68 .207400 
Jasper 3!+,251,490 50,036,640 1,633,366.06 .235800 
Jay 31,180,185 49,760,345 1,259,610.14 .236200 
Jefferson 41,715,460 79,977,500 2,117,695,53 .265200 
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TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties ProEerty ProEert.y_ Property Ratios 
Jennings $ 15,930,740 $ 24,763,300 $ 992,946.06 .224700 
Johnson 68,335,750 97,262,000 3,856,596.30 . 2!~5400 
Knox 50,734,280 79,951,450 2,384,314.68 .229300 
Kosciusko 81,662,770 126,788,180 4,560,823.97 . 245300 
Lagrange 30,709,680 46,108,350 1,968,283.51 .256900 
Lake 615,982,725 1,160 '514' 665 51,290,046.70 .200600 
Laporte 147,483,660 2!.~3' 833 '080 8,803,848.02 .232400 
Lawrence 36,083,920 63,638,685 2,065,921.93 .244600 
Madison 173,671,405 257,580,640 9,287,474.42 .212400 
Marion 1,211,073, 750 1,785,553,640 59,898,504.42 .308800 
Marshall 62,565,390 92,382,040 2,969,727.26 .258100 
Martin 7, 722,930 13,889,210 355,869.37 .230000 
Miami 47,862,135 69,433,705 2,120,975.15 .232400 
Monroe 82,997,580 121,230,110 4, 739 '241.17 .226800 
Montgomery 61,161,420 88,257,420 3,042,084.20 .263500 
Morgc:m !.~3.419,370 70,815,280 2,814,556.25 .203600 
Newton 27, Ol~l, 220 38,735,290 1,585,446.18 .218300 
Noble 38,916,260 62,322,310 2,292,541.62 .236000 
Ohio 4,210,605 5,835,355 210,005.96 .261800 
Orange 18,587,860 29,240,725 1,035,155.89 .260400 
Owen 9,308,070 16,058,140 544,475.08 .171200 
Parke 18,379,780 29,280,910 1,155,258.30 .201800 
Perry 18,558,650 26' 272. Lt-20 880,576.60 .251200 
Pike 14,569,215 26,786,050 706,626.89 .232000 
Porter 110,743,380 222,638,160 8,258,801. 77 .205100 
Posey 31,464,030 L~9, 129,930 1,769,002.75 .220400 
Pulaski 25,832,170 40,860,100 1,403,605.74 .231700 
Putnam 34,080,060 55,871,970 2,257,832.86 .222100 
Randolph t.~ 7 ' 46 7 ' 5 40 68,223,060 1,913,760.10 .297900 
Ripley 21, 11+7' 265 36,295,140 1,558,451.81 .213900 
Rush 38,56!+, 150 53,770,585 1,942,341.98 .245300 
St. Joseph 337,242,510 500,566,550 19,330,350.46 .209000 
Scott lLJ-,522,060 22, 222, 9L,_5 676,626.11 .269600 
Shelby 51,4-42,510 77,121,220 3 ' 2 8 2 ' 7 30 . 54 .223000 
Spencer 19,545,240 30,443,850 820,904.56 .211200 
Starke 28,069,970 42,301,070 1,304,745.64 .235700 
Steuben 29' /+44' 350 !~6,861,290 1,803,345.68 .247400 
Sullivan 2 4 ' 7 z. 2 ' 5 3 5 53,722,780 1,758,886.00 .231300 
Switzerland 10,094,380 15,738,000 465,373.99 .257500 
Tippecanoe lti-5' 85 7' 385 216,376,255 7,543,076.25 .214500 
Tipton 28,05l,Ll-75 Lr1, 5!1-0, 365 1,646,206.23 .219900 
Union 10,304,380 15,378,770 547,357.10 .256300 
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TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties Property Property Property Ratios 
Vander-
burgh $229,069,467 $333,605,867 $10,656,918.42 .257300 
Vermillion 16,312,400 26,647,580 1,123,751.68 .213900 
Vi go 125,339,200 231,615,350 8,477,954.74 .270600 
Habash 45,650,970 71,520,855 2,959,440.26 .248600 
Warren 20,855,170 28,982,675 1,029,777.16 .250700 
Warrick 40,627,275 90,183,055 2,142,570.09 .212100 
Washington 21,425,370 32,668,410 1,189,310.12 .233100 
Wayne 119' 3l~3' 660 178,711,330 5,110,223.84 .282900 
Wells 36,963,920 58,878,210 2,144,289.76 .246600 
'tThite 47,778,830 68,583,920 2,164,577.97 .204000 
Whitley 29,562,340 47,371,275 2,052,547.31 .217800 
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TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
FOR YEAR 1971 
Assess-
Assessed Assessed School Taxes ment 
Value, Value, Levied on Sales 
Real All All Price 
Counties Property Property Property Ratios 
Allen $620,494,250 $824,053,520 $31,099,502.01 .267000 
Bartholo-
mew 123,984,230 173,809,190 7,223,862.09 .241000 
Boone 58,528,020 74,488,390 3,220,333.68 .187000 
Clark 114,041,350 153,560,110 6,215,565.51 .231000 
Clay 30,578,010 42,197,530 1,679,680.95 .188000 
Dearborn 47,819,2.80 91,988,160 2,989,011.50 .195000 
Delaware 171,206,275 249,243,980 10' 716' 394. 70 .243000 
Elkhart 2l~4. 206' 780 3lJ.6, 141, 550 15,247,337.48 .221000 
Floyd 81,567,340 110,021,780 4,502, 708.80 .237000 
Grant 144,088,770 202,339,620 8' 36 3' 439. 35 .265000 
Hamilton 122,025,150 148,889,460 6,450,372.64 .226000 
Hancock 64,082,850 80,318,900 3,408,454.97 .211000 
Hendricks 94,784,310 116,306,785 4,486,106.28 .235000 
Henry 83,661,160 112,078,930 4,560,359.62 .232000 
Howard 183,118,990 256,077,900 9,846,280.01 .247000 
Johnson 94,244,980 120,966,640 4,996,637.44 .203000 
Lake 731,749,265 1,3 21 ' 0 0 1 ' 8 0 0 55,989,704.23 .166000 
Laporte 202,839,260 291,411,930 12,207,194.51 .228000 
Madison 224,627,530 304,781,180 11,568,422.98 .280000 
Harion 1,499,260,570 2,020,634,150 85,635' 171.10 .269000 
Marshall 76,348,260 103,979,680 4,144,133,54 .253000 
Monroe 133,580,885 170,593,610 6,971,466.89 .241000 
Horgan 59,977,500 81,872,310 3,673,067.33 .209000 
Porter 205,655,520 370,739,250 12,794,884.02 .210000 
St. Joseph 479,268,570 615,203,950 22,146,323.13 .247000 
Shelby 65,822,925 89,318,400 4,092,150.44 .251000 
Sullivan 31,069,565 58,266,975 2,493,648.35 .229000 
Tippecanoe 198,987,030 268,787,995 11,785,660.51 .250000 
Vander-
burgh 292,775,640 396,796,305 16,376,919.98 .235000 
Vermillion 29,850,995 53,938,450 1,794,884.07 .172000 
Vi go 174,500,270 276,162,630 10,308,902.82 .187000 
Warrick 65,508,645 125,261,495 3,890,931.24 .207000 
Wayne 149,500,110 202,385,620 6,983,394.75 .266000 
TABLE XLIV (Continued) 
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Adams $ 62,770,300 $ 92,451,300 $ 3,376,014.32 .142000 
























































































1,596' 242' 605 
367,567,990 
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ASSESSMENT-SALES PRICE RATIO 
CALCULATIONS FOR INDIANA, 1964 
A B c D 
1963 1967 Total Average 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly 
ment ment in Change in 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1963-67 1963-67 
Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C -~ 4) 
.2349 .2104 -.0245 -.006125 
.2766 .2782 +.0016 +. 000400 
.2831 .2638 -.0193 -. 00lt825 
.2555 .2682 +.0127 +.003175 
.3016 .2695 -.0321 -.008025 
.2715 .2385 -.0330 -.008250 
.1931 .1485 -.0446 -.011150 
.2699 .2330 -.0369 -.009225 
.2698 .2442 -.0256 -.006400 
.2866 .2342 -.0524 -.013100 
.2528 .2393 -.0135 -.003375 
.2728 .2480 -.0248 -.006200 
.3029 .2444 -.0585 -.014625 
.2233 .1917 -.0316 -.007900 
.2504 .2443 -.0061 -.001525 
.2389 .2343 -.0046 -.001150 
.2637 .2345 -.0292 -.007300 
.2755 .2323 -.0432 -.010800 
.2565 .2497 -.0068 -.001700 
.2877 .2475 -. OLJ-02 -.010050 
.3020 .2482 -· .0538 -.013450 
.2763 .2673 -.0090 -.002250 
.2465 .2113 -.0352 -.008800 
.3021 .2298 -.0723 -.018075 
.2603 .2447 -.0156 -.003900 
.2686 .2560 -.0125 -.003150 
. 2689 .2498 -.0191 -.004775 
.2280 .2250 -.0030 -.000750 
.2763 .2326 -.0437 -.010925 
.2758 .2480 -.0278 -.006950 
.2135 . 211LJ. ~.0021 -'.000525 
. 2Lt04 .2179 -.0225 -.005625 
.3212 . 270 7 -.0505 -.012625 
.2514 .2263 -.0251 -.006275 
.3037 .2LJ02 -.0635 -.015875 
.2569 . 20 7 it -.0495 -.012375 












































. 24Lt5 25 
.226575 
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TABLE XLV (Continued) 
A B c D E 
1963 1967 Total Average 1964 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly Assessment 
ment ment in Change in Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1963-67 1963-67 (estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C + 4) (A+ D) 
Jay .2731+ . 2362 -.0372 -.009300 .264100 
Jefferson .2876 . 2652 -.0224 -.005600 .282000 
Jennings .3194 .2247 -.0947 -.023675 .295725 
Johnson .2474 .2454 -.0020 -.000500 .246900 
Knox .2628 .2293 .-.0335 -.008375 .254425 
Kosciusko .2360 .2453 +.0093 +.002325 .238325 
Lagrange .2707 .2569 -.0138 -.003450 .267250 
Lake .1918 .2006 +.0088 +.002200 .194000 
Laporte .2592 .2324 -.0268 -.006700 .252500 
Lawrence .2525 .2446 -.0079 -.001975 .250525 
Madison .2701 .2124 -.0577 -.014425 .255675 
Marion .3080 .3088 +.0008 +.000200 .308200 
Marshall . 2569 .2581 +.0012 +.000300 .257200 
Martin . 2204. .2300 +.0096 +.002400 .222800 
Miami .2799 .2324 -.0047 -.011875 .268025 
Monroe .2632 .2268 -.0364 -.009100 .254100 
Montgomery .3003 . 2635 -.0368 -.009200 .291100 
Morgan .2463 . 2036 -.0427 -.010675 .235625 
Newton .2300 .2183 -.0117 -.002925 .227075 
Noble .2700 .2360 -.0340 -.008500 .261500 
Ohio .2902 .2618 -.0284 -.007100 .283100 
Orange .3040 .2604 -.0436 -.010900 .293100 
Owen .2309 .1712 -.0597 -.014925 .215975 
Parke .2729 .2018 -.0711 -.017775 .255125 
Perry .3035 .2512 -.0523 -.013075 .290425 
Pike .2667 .2320 -.0347 -.008675 .258025 
Porter .2110 .2051 -.0059 -.001475 .209525 
Posey .2821 .2204 -.0617 -.015425 .266675 
Pulaski .2767 .2317 -. 0450 -.011250 . 265!+50 
Putnam .2605 .2221 -.0384 -.009600 .250900 
Randolph .3154 .2979 -.0179 -.004375 .311025 
Ripley .2375 .2139 -.0236 -.005900 .231600 
Rush .3014 .2453 -.0561 -.014025 .287375 
St. Joseph .2730 .2090 -.0640 -.016000 .257000 
Scott .2675 .2696 +.0021 +.000525 .268025 
Shelby . 2753 .2230 -.0523 -.013075 .262225 
Spencer .3017 .2112 -.0905 -.022625 .279075 
Starke .2833 .2357 -.0476 -.011900 .271400 
Steuben .2440 .2474 +.0034 +.000850 .244850 
Sullivan .2165 .2313 +. 0148 +.003700 .220200 
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TABLE XLV (Continued) 
A B c D E 
1963 1967 Total Average 1964 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly Assessment 
ment ment in Change in Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1963-67 1963-67 (estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C + 4) (A + D) 
SHitzer-
land .2970 . 2575 -.0395 -.009875 .287125 
Tippecanoe .2769 .2145 -.0624 -.015600 .261300 
Tipton .2537 .2199 -.0338 -.008450 .245250 
Union .2945 .2563 -.0382 -.009550 .284950 
Vander-
burgh . 28!+3 . 2573 -.0270 -.006750 .277550 
Vermillion . 2682 .2139 -.0543 -.013575 .254625 
Vi go .2584 .2706 +.0122 +.003050 . 261Lt50 
Wabash .2568 .2486 -.0082 -.002050 .254750 
l\larren .2574 .2507 -.0067 -.001675 .255725 
\.Jarrick . 2646 .2121 -.0525 -.013125 .251475 
Washington .3109 .2331 -.0778 -. 019450 .291450 
Wayne .2907 .2829 -.0078 -.001950 .288750 
Hells .2629 .2466 -.0163 -.004075 .258825 
\,Jhite .2743 .2040 -.0703 -.017575 .256725 
Whitley .2542 .2178 -.0364 -.009100 .245100 
1963 and 1967 ratios are from unpublished information 
furnished by the Indiana State Board of Tax Commissioners, 
Indianapolis, Indiana. 




























DATA FOR OHIO 
TABLE XLVI 
DATA FOR RETENTION RATE 



























































TABLE XLVI (Continued) 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades l-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1965 Fall 1966 
Fulton 7,823 7,937 
Gallia 5,378 5,206 
Geauga 11,827 11,771 
Greene 26,987 26,466 
Guernsey 6 '226 6,132 
Hamilton 141,452 132,148 
Hancock 11,312 11,120 
Hardin 6,946 6,883 
Harrison 4,159 3,999 
Henry 5,542 5,653 
Highland 6,755 6,408 
Hocking L~,069 3' 9 t+6 
Holmes 4,223 3,882 
Huron 10,572 10,471 
Jackson 6,620 6,468 
Jefferson 18,562 18' 302 
Knox 7,620 7' 518 
Lake 36,544 36,697 
Lawrence 12,845 12,378 
Licking 21,717 21' 391 
Logan 7,134 7 ,.oo 1 
Lorain 47,855 47,465 
Lucas 78,100 77,393 
Madison 6,401 6,179 
Mahoning 52,055 52,333 
Marion 13,388 12,733 
Medina 17,662 17,547 
Meigs 4,706 4,491 
Mercer 8' 945 8,771 
Miami 17,043 16,715 
Monroe 3,362 3,278 
Montgomery 110,464 106,550 
Morgan 2,594 2,500 
Morrow 4,674 4,498 
Muskingum 16,968 16,152 
Noble 2,576 2,572 
Ottawa 8,306 7,905 
Paulding 4,329 4,308 
Perry 5,456 5,486 
Picka.way 7,456 7,186 
Pike 5,276 5,049 
Portage 22,611 22,325 
Preble 8,479 8,680 
Putnam 6,514 6,832 












































































































































































































TABLE XLVI (Continued) 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1968 Fall 1969 
Lawrence 12,407 12,068 
Licking 23,179 22,694 
Logan 7 '519 7,335 
Lorain· 52,629 51,977 
Lucas 81,137 79,876 
Madison 6,476 6,336 
Mahoning 53,325 52' 644 
Marion 13,783 13,296 
Medina 19 '5 86 19,445 
Meigs 4,461 4,309 
Mercer 9,250 9,158 
Miami 18,550 18,161 
Monroe 4,247 4,217 
Montgomery 11.5,999 1.10,554 
Morgan 2,674 2,616 
Morrow 4,898 4,809 
Musk in gum 17,362 16' 875 
Noble 2,569 2' 536 
Ottm>Ja 7,706 7,602 
Paulding 4, 617 4,580 
Perry 5,676 5,681 
Pickaway 7,770 7,728 
Pike 5,030 4,873 
Portage 24,899 24,829 
Preble 8,652 8,387 
Putnam 6,988 7,124 
Richland 25,791 24,Lt-68 
Ross 12,735 12,290 
Sandusky 12,392 12,606 
Scioto 16,068 16,155 
Seneca 10,889 10,693 
Shelby 8,398 8,123 
Stark 66,219 67,147 
Summit 107,347 104,357 
Trumbull 46,818 46,528 
Tuscarawas 15,734 15,843 
Union 4,784 4,732 
Van Wert 4,761 4,663 
Vinton 2,149 2,072 
Warren 20 '619 18,375 
Washington 11,119 11,63!+ 
Wayne 18,098 17,903 
Williams 7,161 7,048 
Wood 15,434 15, LJL}l 
vJyandot 4,564 4, 564 
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TABLE XLVI (Continued) 
FOR YEAR 1971 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Conn ties Fall 1972 Fall 1973 
Allen 21,658 21,155 
Ashtabula 20,627 20,161 
Athens 8,736 8,523 
Belmont 12,553 12,418 
Butler 41,695 43,064 
Clark 29,403 29,086 
Clermont 21,279 20,965 
Columbiana 21,580 20,973 
Crawford 10,870 10,313 
Cuyahoga 271,803 264,7L~2 
Delaware 9,006 8,973 
Erie 17,165 16,084 
Fairfield 15,120 15 '199 
Franklin 157,447 151,418 
Geauga 13,022 12,848 
Greene 2 7' 513 26,931 
Hamilton 142,061 1.36 '644 
Hancock 11,984 11,975 
Jefferson 17 '516 16,892 
Lake 39 '045 38,045 
Lawrence 12,121 11,625 
Licking 23,281 23,098 
Lorain 53,108 51' 9 79 
Lucas 81,076 79,006 
Mahoning 51,198 51' 104 
Marion 13' 844 13,331 
Medina 21,448 21,783 
Miami 19,289 18,566 
Hontgomery 107,989 103,027 
Musk in gum 17,283 16,733 
Pickaway 9,055 8,884 
Portage 25,742 25,466 
Preble 7,662 7,582 
Putnam 7,552 7,535 
Richland 24,137 24,056 
Ross 12,029 11,715 
Sandusky 12,699 12,589 
Scioto 14,280 15,196 
Seneca 11' 402 10,689 
Stark 73,013 71,006 
Summit 103,808 101,471 
Trumbull 46,701 47,061 
Tuscarawas 14,331 14,390 
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TABLE XLVI (Continued) 
Enrollment Enrollment 
Grades 1-11 Grades 2-12 
Counties Fall 1972 Fall 1973 
--~------------------- ---------------------~----------
Van Wert 4,502 4,357 
Warren 17,556 17,369 
Washington 11,250 11,128 
Wayne 17,890 17,475 
Wood 14,776 15,562 
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From data furnished by the Ohio Department of Education. 
TABLE XLVII 
DATA FOR EFFECTIVE TAX RATE 
CALCULATIONS IN OHIO 




Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Adams .01342857 $ 19,859,850 .31930 
Allen .01734583 196,385,340 . 37525 
Ashland .02209250 71,453,180 .37375 
Ashtabula .01924429 177,820,010 .36890 
Athens .01608750 43,458,030 . 35 730 
Auglaize .01995556 72,027,680 .34990 
Belmont .01648800 113,522,550 .40425 
Brown .01754286 32,557,810 .29635 
Butler .02136820 407,830,480 .38315 
Carroll .01654000 26,086,100 .36210 
Champaign .01792000 57,951,130 .37655 
Clark .01912143 255,719,470 .41295 
Clermont .02165556 131,850,930 .38310 
Clinton .02040000 59,939,010 .35400 
Columbiana . 01929091 145,928,240 . 36 845 
Coshocton .0152.3333 55,330,030 . 3 7085 
Crmv-ford .01876667 91,834,750 .34905 
Cuyahoga .02404156 4,071,564,070 .37475 
Darke .01983000 96, lOl1-, 110 .35915 
Defiance . 0189!+000 64,648,625 .35800 
Dela\vare .01787500 74,186,840 .34210 
Erie .01913250 145,303,870 .34470 
Fairfield .01848750 122,475,410 .37060 
Fayette .01900000 56,407,040 . 36330 
Franklin . 0198182le 1,518,521,220 .38295 
Fulton .02130000 64,372,920 . 36185 
Gallia .01410000 25,931,020 .34370 
Geauga .02862500 116,864,150 .34750 
Greene .02176429 197,093,140 .40885 
Guernsey .01792000 49,311,310 .34355 
Hamilton .01901708 2,252,872,100 . 435 75 
Hancock .01945000 129,225,230 .34590 
Hardin .01695000 54,723,120 . 34630 
Harrison .01677273 28,527,510 .46150 
Henry .01767000 65,863,590 . 326 70 
Highland .01960000 46,928,990 .33525 
Hocking .01538750 23,791,440 .33080 
Holmes .01460000 32,810,630. .37920 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Huron .02080125 $ 80,216,000 .33000 
Jackson .01712000 26,712,220 .36380 
Jefferson .01705769 168,235,340 .38655 
Knox .02030000 68,612,490 .37380 
Lake .02610000 360,928,090 .35555 
Lawrence .01445000 61,148,190 .33020 
Licking .01763500 161,02L~, 760 .34505 
Logan .01778333 70,979,060 .37380 
Lorain .02372600 431,829,340 .34810 
Lucas .02181000 922,298,430 .39130 
Madison .01932000 55,348,860 .34715 
Mahoning .02277933 611,171,760 .38950 
Marion .02460000 115,295,760 .37050 
He dina .02368571 136,929,940 .35190 
Meigs .01510000 17,750,910 .36440 
Mercer .01913750 68,400,280 .33550 
Miami .01964545 145,885,490 .35940 
Monroe .01435000 35,891,660 .40400 
Montgomery .02251412 1,137,533,620 .41290 
Morgan .02830000 14,574,550 . 3 76 35 
Morrow .01807500 32,712,580 .33475 
Huskingum .·o 16 32500 106,021,600 .36060 
Noble .01820000 12,367,830 .33315 
Ottawa .01677000 78,147,570 .32750 
Paulding .01970000 36,196,600 .31495 
Perry .01695000 25,571,800 . 33500 
Pickmvay .01630000 65,752,200 .30045 
Pike .01640000 17,405,290 .34660 
Portage .02437500 164,433,690 .33335 
Preble .02266000 58,806,410 .33490 
Putnam .01828333 61,144,950 .33910 
Richland .02206667 242,621,600 .36420 
Roxx .01627000 91,940 '240 .37855 
Sandusky .02060500 109,897,590 .36295 
Scioto .01557273 107,598,520 .39070 
Seneca .01822727 107, Lt-32, 190 . 34-035 
Shelby .01931250 68,260,600 .34965 
Stark .02050000 698,092,100 .41965 
Summit .02527000 1,131,284,980 .37505 
Trumbull .02270000 434,103,440 .37850 
Tuscarawas .02020000 112,600,340 . 35265 
Union .01856667 41,279,650 .33140 
Van Wert .02025000 64,150,130 .33590 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Vinton .01608333 $ 7,927,920 .30190 
\varren .02001000 116,340,640 .34765 
Washington .01643750 93,302,490 .36090 
Wayne .02225000 140,888,080 . 35 80 5 
~Jilliams .01861667 60,651,680 .35775 
Wood .02313333 154,242,980 .32480 
Wayndot .01882500 46,106,490 . 35 225 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Adams .01446000 $ 20,885,760 .2623333 
Allen . 01929091 226,446,360 .3582666 
Ashland .02430000 80,881,670 .3339666 
Ashtabula .02217143 184,760,890 .3514666 
Athens .01942000 54,731,660 .3198333 
Auglaize .02255000 75,634,980 .3190333 
Belmont .01875300 118,382,830 .3698000 
Brown .01855000 34,237,310 .2685666 
Butler .02356000 442,995,880 . 3Ll-94666 
Carroll .02275000 31,937,830 .3421666 
Champaign .02262000 62,416,960 .3371000 
Clark .02407000 264,912,400 .3550666 
Clermont .02375556 14-6 '441' 720 .3534333 
Clinton .02105000 62,806,240 .3351333 
Columbiana .02335455 153' 284-' 390 .3450000 
Coshocton .01850000 64,807,810 .3507000 
Crawford .02146667 99,567,650 .3196666 
Cuyahoga .02787313 4,312,375,680 .3483333 
Darke .02278000 101,627,660 .3225666 
Defiance .02104000 71,907,125 .3128333 
Delaware .02087500 80,837,840 .3029333 
Erie .02498571 159,975)250 .3083000 
Fairfield .02111250 136,840,070 .3351000 
Fayette .01900000 59,480,910 .3176000 
Franklin .02339471 1,723,816,800 .3542333 
Fulton .02338750 76,878,750 .3332666 
Gallia .01558333 27,534-,050 .3187666 
Geauga .03300000 127,392,490 .3135333 
Greene .02507857 218,335,010 .3484333 
Guernsey .01980000 52,748,712 .3460333 
Hamilton .02276875 2,374,805,640 .4138666 
Hancock .02106250 138,431,080 .3119666 
Hardin .02063333 56,814,900 .3252666 
Harrison .01966667 29,382,160 .4262000 
Henry .02250000 69,214,870 .2877666 
Highland .02104000 48,987,360 .3070666 
Hocking .02083750 26,865,980 .2989666 
Holmes .01692500 35,344,520 .3247000 
Huron .02424500 86,636,020 .2939333 
Jackson .01798000 27,793,760 .3034333 
Jefferson .01856000 184,431,030 .3714666 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Knox .02382000 $ 77,972,390 .3406333 
Lake .03087111 397,752,140 .3113333 
Lawrence .01592857 63,890,710 .3093333 
Licking .01969000 179,224,410 .3218333 
Logan .02080000 74,155,350 .3483333 
Lorain .02778400 469,664,890 .3238333 
Lucas .02512500 996,056,630 .3475000 
Hadison .01964000 65,788,650 .3237666 
Mahoning .02616400 639,748,480 .3829000 
.Marion .02186000 127,648,300 .3526000 
He dina .02678571 150,180,350 .3064000 
Heigs .01610000 18,108,600 .3074333 
Mercer .02052857 72,641,490 .2893000 
Hi ami .02258182 156,944,550 .3186000 
1'1.onroe .01847500 36,041,180 .3609333 
Montgomery .02495750 1,282,766,840 .3687666 
Horgan .01830000 15,102,710 .3174333 
Morrow .02237500 37,052,291 .2915000 
Huskingum .01915556 111,638,630 .3370333 
Noble .01786667 13,935,240 .3441333 
Ottawa .01920625 81,933,660 .2949000 
Paulding .02037143 38,352,950 .3048334 
Perry .01787000 26,790,390 .3067000 
Pickmvay .01907500 70,932,850 .3252333 
Pike .01840000 18,277,909 .2993333 
Portage .02690455 182,413,320 .3065000 
Preble .02396000 62,285,080 .2999333 
Putnam .02095000 65,456,800 .2965000 
Richland .02677778 262,283,510 . 34Lt8000 
Ross .01948571 101,316,990 .3456333 
Sandusky .02321250 120,890,040 .3284666 
Scioto .01745091 112,351,060 .3708000 
Seneca .02238182 113,533,810 .3156000 
Shelby .02208750 72,955,860 .3217000 
Stark .02313529 751,948,820 .3856000 
Summit .02596235 1,303,730,560 .3621000 
Trumbull .02475435 476,337,950 .3495333 
Tuscarawas .02285000 121,732,470 .3195666 
Union .02053333 47,578,430 .2963000 
Van Hert .02257500 67,133,040 .3193000 
Vinton .01540000 10,004,920 .3249000 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Allen .024100000 $242,899,620 .3010 
Ashtabula .030685714 201,860,640 .2910 
Athens .025400000 63 '091+' 940 .2810 
Belmont .024064285 138,018,260 .2760 
Butler .028276666 509,352,350 .2780 
Clark .028731428 318,579,040 .3170 
Clermont .029688888 158,140,310 .2540 
Columbiana .025672727 190,124,930 .2900 
Crawford .028133333 119 ' 7 1+4' 0 2 0 .2900 
Cuyahoga .034965625 4,7 6 8 ' 7 9 6 ' 7 3 0 .3130 
Delaware .027050000 108,437,61~0 .2420 
Erie .031307142 194,493,620 .2820 
Fairfield .027750000 173,553,040 .3000 
Franklin .030703750 2[J32,289,460 .3000 
Geauga .039857142 170,976,750 .2570 
Greene .031435714 253,663,740 .2840 
Hamilton .032286363 2,560,227,840 .3530 
Hancock .026725000 175,533,510 .3040 
Jefferson .022150000 201,867,920 .3980 
Lake .·o 3 7006666 534,835,480 .2980 
Lawrence .021142857 75,140,310 .2770 
Licking .032400000 220,800,860 .2960 
Lorain .033192000 589,470,743 .3028 
Lucas . 031L~25000 1,139, 953 '6 70 .2870 
Mahoning .031740714 666,992,758 .3260 
Marion .026800000 153,446,110 .3260 
Medina .035742857 215,227,700 .2600 
Miami .028822222 215,790,900 .3140 
Hontgomery .032990000 ljt83,766,860 .3080 
Muskingum .025525000 131,081,590 .3070 
Pickaway .021950000 93,727,280 .3090 
Portage .034977272 252,950,970 .2780 
Preble .028520000 79,543,650 .2630 
Putnam .024722222 81,553,920 .2820 
Richland .033277777 304,657,800 .3220 
Ross .023100000 115,355,270 .3350 
Sandusky .029360000 130,961,910 .2460 
Scioto .020550000 119,207,090 .3240 
Seneca . 0 2 7 4 71~.2 8 141.,643,320 .3100 
Stark .029335294 832,882,010 .2900 
Summit .034321764 1/J-44, 246, OL~O .2790 
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Hillage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Property Price Ratios 
Trumbull .028923809 $575 ,304,1+80 .2970 
Tuscarawas .028525000 148,247,650 .2570 
Van Wert .026312500 82,016,220 .3060 
Warren .027656250 158,217,690 .2730 
Washington .021458333 122,14Ll-,670 .2940 
Wayne .031300000 184,252,080 .2970 
Wood .029272222 227,749,230 .2600 
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Millage Real Sales 
Counties Rate Pr<2_Eerty Price Ratios 
Allen .02390 $365,151,080 .2700 
Ashtabula .02609 324,200,910 .2010 
Belmont .02592 247,224,440 .1750 
Butler .02600 872,651,070 .3220 
Carroll .02605 50,881,130 .1680 
Champaign .02862 86,806,930 .1950 
Clark .02880 363 '4l~9 '260 .2160 
Clermont .02692 303,683,240 .2350 
Columbiana .02434 2 7 7 , L,. 8 2 , 18 0 .2470 
Cuyahoga .03812 6,486,854,880 .2870 
Delaware .02101 242,986,927 .3300 
Erie .03306 330,949,580 .2500 
Fiarfield .02805 220,753,710 .1680 
Franklin .02446 3,64lj,472,160 .2990 
Fulton .03031 154,774,010 .1570 
Geauga .03136 312,898,670 .2390 
Greene .03096 427,218,000 .2720 
Hamilton .03073 3,309,219,277 .2810 
Lake .04022 938,293,920 . 3040 
Lawrence .'02172 129,293,910 .1870 
Licking .02554 3 7 4, 8 7 6 , 0 Lt-0 .2570 
Lorain .03551 967,117,460 .2640 
Lucas .03371 2,027,434,940 . 35 70 
Madison .02536 125,094,000 .2340 
Mahoning .02893 9!+2, 86 7, 880 .2730 
Marion .03130 172,477,700 .2160 
Medina .03559 297,393,030 .2010 
Miami .03024 254,687,300 .4250 
Montgomery .03069 2,000,091,370 .2720 
Ottawa .02616 194,816,190 .2470 
Pickm.vay .02216 163,475,090 .2950 
Portage .03706 476,621,330 .2670 
Preble .02326 164,729,540 .3040 
Richland .02881 445,465,760 .3270 
Sandusky .02606 241,282,010 .2960 
Scioto .02447 174,524,520 .2140 
Stark .03017 1,439,089,710 .3390 
Summit .03153 2, 140,3ll,lt-10 .2890 
Trumbull .02647 847,392,881 .2600 
























Sources: (35) for millage rates; assessed values and 
ratios are compiled from data furnished by the Ohio 








































ASSESSl1ENT-SALES PRICE RATIO 
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TABLE XLVIII (Continued) 
A B c 
1963 1965 1964 
Assess- Assess- Assessment 
ment ment Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios 
Price Price ( estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios _(A+B + 2 
Holmes .3879 .3705 .37920 
Huron .3392 .3208 .33000 
Jackson .3669 .3607 .36380 
Jefferson .3911 .3820 .38655 
Knox .3697 .3779 .37380 
Lake .3599 .3512 .35555 
Lawrence .3396 .3208 .33020 
Licking .3522 .3379 .34505 
Logan .3824 .3652 .37380 
Lorain . 3551 .3411 .34810 
Lucas .4079 .3747 .31930 
Madison .3418 .3525 .34715 
Mahoning .3867 .3923 .38950 
Marion .3786 .3624 .37050 
Medina .3600 .3438 .35190 
Meigs .3777 .3511 .36440 
Mercer . 3538 .3133 . 33355 
Miami .3684 • 3SOL~ .35940 
Monroe . 42LI-4 .3836 .40400 
Montgomery .4219 .£1.039 .41290 
Morgan .3948 . 35 79 . 376 35 
Horrow .3444 .3251 .33475 
Musk in gum . 3639 .3573 .36060 
Noble .3159 .3504 .33315 
Ottawa .3255 .3295 .32750 
Paulding .3340 .2959 .31495 
Perry .3371 .3329 .33500 
Pickaway .3674 . 3535 . 3004-5 
Pike . 3582 .3350 . 3L!-660 
Portage .3350 .3317 .33335 
Preble .3468 .3230 .33490 
Putnam .3559 .3223 .33910 
Richland .3600 .3684 .36420 
Ross .3810 .3761 .37855 
Sandusky .3661 .3598 .36295 
Scioto .4008 .3806 .39070 
Seneca . 3571 .3236 .36035 
Shelby .3632 .3361 .34965 
Stark .4285 .4108 .41965 
Summit .3658 .3843 .37505 
Trumbull .3854 .3716 .37850 
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TABLE XLVIII (Continued) 
A B c 
1963 1965 1964 
Assess- Assess- Assessment 
ment ment Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios 
Price Price (estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios (A+B -:- 2 
Tuscarawas . 36lfl- .3439 .35265 
Union .3369 .3259 .33140 
Van Wert .3567 .3151 .33590 
Vinton . 3029 .3009 .30190 
Warren .3509 .3444 .34765 
Washington .3658 .3560 .36090 
Wayne .3385 .3776 .35805 
Williams . 3868 .3287 .35775 
vJood .3395 .3101 . 32l!80 
Hyandot .3498 .3.547 .3.522.5 
1963 and 1967 ratios are from information furnished by 










































ASSESSMENT-SALES PRICE RATIO 
CALCULATIONS FOR OHIO 
1967 
B c D 
1968 Total Average 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly 
ment ment in Change in 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1965-68 1965-68 
Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C + 3) 
.3064 .2403 -.0661 -.0220333 
.3742 . 3503 -.0239 -.0079666 
.3751 .3134 -.0617 -.0205666 
.3664 . 34-40 -.0224 -.007!+666 
.3667 .2964 -.0703 -. 0 23!+333 
. 34-29 .3071 -. 0 35 8 -.0119333 
.3926 .3584 -. 0342 -.0114000 
.3021 .2518 -.0503 -.0167666 
.3738 .3373 -. 0 365 -.0121666 
.3645 .3310 -.0335 -.0111666 
.3639 .3237 -.0402 -. o 13L~ooo 
.3910 .3371 -.0539 -.0179666 
.3845 .3379 -. 0466 -.0155333 
.3458 .3298 -.0160 -.0053333 
. 3646 .3352 -.0294 -.0098000 
.3561 .3480 -.0081 -.0027000 
.3466 .3062 -. 04-0LJ. -.0134666 
.3684 .3383 -. 0301 -.0100333 
.3431 .3123 -. 0308 -.0102666 
.3405 .2990 -. 0415 -.0138333 
.3406 .2841 -.0565 -.0188333 
.3337 .2956 -.0381 -.0127000 
.3687 .3183 -.0504 -.0168000 
.3574 .2977 -.0597 -.0199000 
.3805 .3411 -.0394 -.0131333 
.3700 .3149 -.0551 -.0183666 
.3371 .3096 -.0275 -.0091666 
.3478 .2964 -.0514 -.0171333 
.3935 .3259 -.0676 -.0225333 
.3463 .3459 -.0004 -.0001333 
.4388 .4014 -.0374 -.0124666 
.3459 .2950 -.0509 -.0169666 
.3344 .3207 -.0137 -.0045666 
.4416 . 4185 -.0231 -.0077000 
.3167 .2733 -. 0L;34 -.0144666 
.3340 .2936 -. 0404 -.0134-666 















































TABLE XLIX (Continued) 
A B c D E 
1965 1968 Total Average 1967 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly Assessment 
ment ment in Change in Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1965-68 1965-68 (estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C + 3) (B-D) 
Holmes .3705 .3018 -.0687 -.0229000 .3247000 
Huron .3208 .2805 -.0403 -.0134333 .2939333 
Jackson .3607 .2748 -.0859 -.0286333 . 303l~333 
Jefferson .3820 . 36 6 2. -.0158 -.0052.666 .3714666 
Knox .3779 .3220 -.0559 -.0186333 .3406333 
Lake . 3512 .2914 -.0598 -.0199333 .3113333 
Lawrence .3208 . 3036 -.0172. -.0057333 .3093333 
Licking .3379 .3138 -.0241 -.0080333 .3218333 
Logan .3652 .3399 -.0253 -.0084333 .3483333 
Lorain .3411 .3152 -.0259 -. 0086.333 .3238333 
Lucas .3747 .3339 -.0408 -.0136000 .3475000 
Madison .3525 .3094 -.0431 -.0143666 .3237666 
Mahoning . 3923 .3782 -. Olt.:-1 -.0047000 .3829000 
Marion .3624 .3477 -.0147 -.0049000 .3526000 
Medina .3438 .2877 -.0561 -.0187000 .3064000 
Meigs . 3511 .2856 -.0655 -.0218333 .3074333 
Mercer .3133 .2773 -. 0360 -.0120000 .2893000 
Miami .3504 .3027 -.0477 -.0159000 .3186000 
Monroe .3826 .3496 -.0340 -.0113333 .3609333 
Montgomery .4039 . 3512 -.0527 -.0175666 .3687666 
Morgan . 3579 .2972 -.0607 -.0202333 .3174333 
Morrow . 3251 .2747 -.050lt -.0168000 .2915000 
Musk in gum .3573 .3269 -.0304 -.0101333 .3370333 
Noble . 350!+ .3410 -. 0091+ -.0031333 .3441333 
Ottawa .3295 .2776 -.0519 -.0173000 .2949000 
Paulding .2959 .3093 +.0134 +.0044666 .3048334 
Perry .3329 .2936 -.0393 -.0131000 .3067000 
Pickaway . 3535 .3111 -.0424 -.0141333 .3252333 
Pike .3350 .2815 -.0535 -.0178333 .2993333 
Portage .3317 .2939 -.0378 -.0126000 .3065000 
Preble .3230 .2884 -.0346 -.0115333 .2999333 
Putnam .3223 . 2836 -.0387 -.0129000 .2965000 
Richland .3684 .3330 -.0354 -.0118000 .3448000 
Ross .3761 .3304. -.0457 -.0152333 .3456333 
Sandusky . 3598 .3128 -.0470 -.0156666 .3284666 
Scioto .3806 .3659 -.0147 -.0049000 .3708000 
Seneca .3236 .3116 -.0120 -.0040000 .3156000 
Shelby .3361 .3145 -.0216 -.0072000 .3217000 
Stark .4108 .3730 -.0378 -.0126000 .38.56000 
Summit .3843 .3510 -.0333 -.0111000 .3621000 
Trumbull .3716 .3385 .:.0331 -.0110333 .3495333 
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TABLE XLIX (Continued) 
A B c D E 
1965 1968 Total Average 1967 
Assess- Assess- Change Yearly Assessment 
ment ment in Change in Sales Price 
Sales Sales Ratios Ratios Ratios 
Price Price 1965-68 1965-68 (estimated) 
Counties Ratios Ratios (B-A) (C + 3) (B-D) 
Tuscarawas .3439 .3074 -.0365 -.0121666 .3195666 
Union .3259 . 2815 -. 044Lj. -.0148000 .2963000 
Van Wert . 3151 .3214 +.0063 +.0021000 .3193000 
Vinton .3009 .3369 +.0360 +.0120000 .3249000 
Warren .3444 .3123 -.0321 -.0107000 .3230000 
Washington .3560 .3213 -.0347 -.0115666 .3328666 
Wayne .3776 .3379 -.0397 -.0132333 .3511333 
Williams .3287 .2969 -.0318 -.0106000 .3075000 
Wood .3101 .2664 -.0437 -.0145666 .2809666 
Wyandot .3547 .3217 -.0330 -.0110000 .3327000 
1965 and 1968 ratios are from information furnished 
by the Ohio Department of Tax Equalization, Columbus, Ohio. 
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